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619 
HOLDING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
ACCOUNTABLE UNDER THE FOREIGN 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT: CIVIL ACTIONS 
AGAINST THE UNITED NATIONS FOR  
NON-COMMERCIAL TORTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Mitrovica Detention Center 
During the afternoon hours of April 17, 2004, bedlam reigned at the 
U.N.-run Mitrovica Detention Center in northern Kosovo.1 Having 
completed the first day of pre-induction training, a group of international 
correctional and police officers2 were preparing to exit the facility when an 
assailant unexpectedly began firing at the group’s three-vehicle convoy.3 
Trapped between the facility’s closed gate and several buildings, the 
officers were in the “killing zone” of the Jordanian shooter’s deadly 
volley.4 But for a fortuitous event—the malfunctioning of the gunman’s 
weapon—the officers would have been unable to mount the counterattack 
which ultimately ended the unprovoked assault.5 In the end, three 
Americans lay dead while eleven others suffered serious injury.6 
 
 
 1. Press Briefing, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Statement of 
Police Commissioner Stefan Feller, Special Press Conference on Shooting Incident in Mitrovica 
Detention Centre Involving International Officers, Unofficial Transcript (Apr. 18, 2004), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/trans/tr180404.pdf. 
 2. The group of twenty-four international officers consisted of twenty-one Americans, two 
Turks, and one Austrian. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Kosovo Prison Shooter May Have Had Hamas Ties, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 24, 2004, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,118065,00.html [hereinafter Kosovo Prison Shooter]. Although 
the gunman was actually Palestinian, for consistency, I refer to him in this Note as Jordanian since he 
was a member of that country’s police contingent. 
 5. In fact, once the assailant’s weapon malfunctioned, the officers, who were originally armed 
only with pistols, seized several automatic rifles from the perpetrator’s fellow countrymen and 
counterattacked the gunman’s position, striking him fatally sixteen times. Id. 
 6. At the conclusion of the attack, two American officers had been killed, in addition to the 
Jordanian gunman. Press Release, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, SRSG 
Expresses Shock and Dismay at the Shooting Incident Involving International Officers, U.N. Doc. 
UNMIK/PR/1169 (Apr. 17, 2004), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2004/pressr/ 
pr1169/pdf. However, within days, another American officer died as a result of injuries sustained 
during the incident. Eli Kintisch, Man Hurt in Shooting in Kosovo Dies from Wounds, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Apr. 26, 2004, at A8. The deceased American officers were Gary A. Weston, 52; Kim 
Marie Bigley, 47; and Lynn Marie Williams, 48. Michael Kelly, Corrections Officers Shot at U.N. 
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In the context of the numerous and often volatile regional conflicts and 
terrorist attacks of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, this 
episode does not appear to be anything but a commonplace event. What 
makes this particular incident extraordinary is not that it occurred; rather, 
it is the relationship of the perpetrator to the victims of his homicidal and 
maniacal rampage.7 The gunman, Ahmed Mustafa Ibrahim Ali, was a 
Sergeant Major in the Jordanian Special Police Unit, a contingent of the 
civilian police force of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK). The targets of Ali’s rage: his fellow officers.8  
Adding insult to injury, the post-incident actions of the victims’ 
employer—the United Nations—can be described as equally despicable. 
According to one of the injured officers, the United Nations failed to 
provide the necessary follow-up medical or psychological care.9 Nor did 
the United Nations compensate the officers or their respective estates for 
any lost wages.10 
B. Scope of This Note 
What remedies do these victims have? Can they sue the United Nations 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior?11 Or is the United Nations 
immune from liability for its actions and those of the employee-gunman? 
Short of a private bill,12 what is the current status of the law in this regard? 
More importantly, can existing laws be used to compensate the victims? 
 
 
Detention Center in Kosovo, CORRECTIONS TODAY, June 2004, at 62, available at http://www.aca.org/ 
fileupload/177/prasannak/kosovo.pdf. 
 7. The term “maniacal” is an apt description of the gunman since, according to survivor 
accounts, the Jordanian was “smiling during his shooting spree.” Kosovo Prison Shooter, supra note 4. 
 8. Id. Special Police Units (SPUs) are highly mobile, self-sufficient, paramilitary forces capable 
of rapid deployment to high-risk situations and, as such, are distinct from the regular UNMIK Police. 
Generally, SPU officers conduct crowd control during violent demonstrations and civil unrest; provide 
facility protection where necessary; and, ironically, provide protection and security to U.N. officials, 
UNMIK Police, and Border Police in the discharge of their duties. UNMIKOnline.org, Police & 
Justice (Pillar I)—Police, http:///www.unmikonline.org/justice/police.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
 9. Jeff Golimowski, Worker Injured in Kosovo Says She Has Been Brushed Aside, KAKE.COM, 
Mar. 23, 2006, http://www.kake.com/home/headlines/2518316.html. By way of illustration, Elizabeth 
Mechler, a correctional officer from Kansas, received a gunshot wound to the femoral artery of her left 
leg, returned to duty with crutches after six days in a military hospital, and was then summarily 
returned to the United States within a year. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. An open issue, not addressed in this Note, is whether Jordan, as the nation which “seconded” 
Ali to the United Nations, could be held vicariously liable for the officers’ injuries. 
 12.  
Private laws differ from public laws in that they lack general applicability and do not apply to 
all persons. Instead they are generally designed to provide legal relief to specified persons or 
entities adversely affected by laws of general applicability. Private laws apply only to the 
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This Note attempts to answer these questions. In Part II, I provide some 
background and briefly describe the two statutes relevant to any inquiry 
potentially involving tort claims against an international organization. In 
Part III, I discuss two independent approaches to overcoming the 
inevitable claim of immunity. Finally, in Part IV, I apply the results of my 
examination to the aforementioned incident. Of course, the best starting 
point for any analysis involving potential suits against the United Nations 
or its political trustee13 is a short history of the wounded officers’ primary 
obstacle: immunity. 
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
A. The Evolution of Sovereign Immunity 
1. Absolute Immunity 
“Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon[14] . . . is generally viewed as the source of [the Supreme 
Court’s] foreign sovereign immunity jurisprudence.”15 In The Schooner 
Exchange, the Court confronted the overarching issue of whether the 
authority of American courts could be extended over independent 
sovereign powers. Concluding that “foreign sovereigns have no right to 
immunity in [American] courts,”16 the Court nonetheless recognized that 
 
 
person named in the law and grant a benefit from the government to that person, not 
otherwise authorized by law . . . . The simplest definition of a private bill was offered by the 
late Asher Hinds, House Parliamentarian: A private bill is a bill for the relief of one or several 
specified persons, corporations, institutions, etc., and is distinguished from a public bill, 
which relates to public matters and deals with individuals only by classes. 
Matthew Mantel, Private Bills and Private Laws, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 87, 88 (2007) (internal quotation 
marks and footnotes omitted). 
 13. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Providing Judicial Review for Decisions by Political Trustees, 15 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 1 n.1 (2004) (citing Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political 
Trusteeship, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 385, 389 (2003)) (defining political trustee as one or 
more states or international organizations exercising sovereignty over foreign territory). 
 14. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Libellants alleged that 
while sailing to Spain on their vessel, it was seized on the orders of Napoleon, the Emperor of France, 
and outfitted as a “national armed vessel” of that country. Id. at 117, 146. Having been commissioned 
as a public vessel, it was later driven into the port of Philadelphia for safe harbor as a result of 
inclement weather, whereupon, the vessel “was seized, arrested, and detained in pursuance of the 
process of attachment issued upon the prayer of the libellants.” Id. at 118. 
 15. Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 688 (2004). 
 16. Id. See The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136 (“The jurisdiction of the nation within its 
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by 
itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of 
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent 
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as a matter of grace and comity, the United States impliedly waives its 
jurisdiction over certain activities of foreign sovereigns.17 
Interpreting The Schooner Exchange as extending absolute immunity18 
to foreign sovereigns19 and noting that immunity is not mandatory under 
the Constitution, the Court began the practice of regularly deferring to the 
executive branch for the determination of whether a foreign sovereign 
should be granted immunity in an action before a court.20 
Such deference to executive discretion by the courts was firmly 
established in a series of cases which reached the Supreme Court in the 
1940s. In Ex parte Peru,21 concluding that “the case involves the dignity 
and rights of a friendly sovereign state,”22 the Supreme Court felt 
compelled to grant the requested relief23 in order to avoid the delay and 
inconvenience of prolonged litigation.24 To hold otherwise–allowing 
courts to seize and detain the property of foreign sovereigns–would 
“embarrass the executive arm of the government in conducting foreign 
relations.”25 The Court commented further that when the Department of 
State through its Secretary chooses to settle claims against a vessel via 
 
 
in that power which could impose such restriction. All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete 
power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They 
can flow from no other legitimate source.”). 
 17. The Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 137 (“This perfect equality and absolute independence of 
sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of 
good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in which every sovereign is understood 
to wave [sic] the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been 
stated to be the attribute of every nation.”); Altmann, 541 U.S. at 688. 
 18. Absolute immunity, also known as “classical immunity,” is defined as the inability of one 
sovereign to be made a respondent in a case before a court of another sovereign without the consent of 
the former. Tate Letter, infra note 32, at 984. 
 19. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (“Although the narrow 
holding of The Schooner Exchange was only that the courts of the United States lack jurisdiction over 
an armed ship of a foreign state found in our port, that opinion came to be regarded as extending 
virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns.”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943). 
 22. Id. at 586–87. 
 23. Id. at 589–90. In the lower court, a Cuban corporation filed a libel suit against the Peruvian 
steamship “Ucayali” for failure to follow through on a charter agreement entered into between the 
corporation and a Peruvian corporation acting on behalf of the government of Peru. Id. at 580. The 
government of Peru sought and received from the U.S. Department of State formal recognition of the 
claim of immunity; however, the district court refused to accept the executive grant of immunity. Id. at 
581–82. On a motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, the Republic of 
Peru sought to prevent the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana from exercising 
continued jurisdiction over the steamship. Id. at 579. The motion was granted; however, the Supreme 
Court was of the opinion that formal issuance of a writ would be unnecessary, such that it would issue 
only upon further application by the petitioner. Id. at 590. 
 24. Id. at 587. 
 25. Id. at 588. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] HOLDING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ACCOUNTABLE 623 
 
 
 
 
diplomatic channels instead of continued litigation in a court of law, “it is 
of public importance that the action of the political arm of the Government 
taken within its appropriate sphere be promptly recognized . . . .”26 
Two years later, in the case of Mexico v. Hoffman,27 the Supreme Court 
was confronted with a situation similar to that which occurred in Ex parte 
Peru.28 Reiterating Chief Justice Marshall’s introduction of the practice of 
deferring to the executive branch,29 the Court refused to grant immunity to 
the foreign sovereign, thus permitting the action to be pursued against 
Mexico. In so holding, the Court stated that “[i]n the absence of 
recognition of the claimed immunity by the political branch of the 
government, the courts may decide for themselves whether all the 
requisites of immunity exist.”30 The Court concluded by stating that “it is 
the duty of the courts, in a matter so intimately associated with our foreign 
policy and which may profoundly affect it, not to enlarge an immunity to 
an extent which the government, although often asked, has not seen fit to 
recognize.”31 
2. Restrictive Immunity 
In a 1952 letter (Tate Letter) to the Acting Attorney General, the U.S. 
Department of State announced the formal adoption of the policy of 
denying immunity to foreign sovereigns for certain categories of 
activities.32 This policy shift from granting absolute immunity to 
 
 
 26. Id. at 587. “[T]he judicial seizure of the vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a 
challenge to its dignity, and may so affect our friendly relations with it, that courts are required to 
accept and follow the executive determination that the vessel is immune.” Id. at 588. 
 27. Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). 
 28. In this libel in rem action against the ship “Baja California,” the Republic of Mexico, through 
its ambassador, claimed that title to the ship was held in the name of the Republic. Id. at 31. Plaintiff 
challenged the claim to title and averred that at no time was the ship within the government’s 
possession, public service, or use. Id. Acting through the U.S. Attorney for the district, the U.S. 
Department of State reiterated Mexico’s claim to title but took no position regarding the vessel’s 
immunity. Id. at 31–32. Finding no precedent, the district court denied the claim to immunity. Id. at 
32. The district court denied a second claim to immunity, and on the merits, granted judgment in favor 
of libellant. Id. at 32–33. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that Mexico was not immune due to lack 
of possession and service. Id. at 33. 
 29. Id. at 34. 
 30. Id. at 34–35. 
 31. Id. at 38. 
 32. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, 
Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952), 26 Dep’t State Bull. 984 (1952), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill 
of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. 
Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (“[I]n the so-called Tate Letter, the State Department 
announced its adoption of the ‘restrictive’ theory of foreign sovereign immunity.”). See also H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6607. 
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restrictive immunity33 was founded upon multiple rationales.34 First, and 
most importantly, the State Department recognized the growing trend 
among members of the international community to abandon absolute 
immunity in favor of restrictive immunity.35 Second, since the grant of 
absolute immunity was based on reciprocity rather than right, granting 
such immunity would be “inconsistent with the action of the Government 
of the United States in subjecting itself to suit . . . and with its long 
established policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdictions 
. . . .”36 Lastly, restrictive immunity allows courts to determine the rights 
of persons wronged through their interaction with those governments that 
participate in activities traditionally reserved for commercial enterprises.37 
According to the Supreme Court, the Tate Letter, with its adoption of 
the doctrine of restrictive immunity, had little positive effect on the 
necessary analysis completed by federal courts when determining if a 
foreign nation should receive immunity.38 Indeed, the Tate Letter actually 
caused additional problems for both the executive and judicial branches, 
as well as for the litigants themselves.39 
 
 
 33. Restrictive immunity is defined as “the immunity of [a] sovereign . . . with regard to . . . 
public acts (jure imperii) . . . , but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis).” Tate Letter, supra 
note 32, at 984. 
 34. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 702. 
 35. Tate Letter, supra note 32, at 984; Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704 (“There may be little 
codification or consensus as to the rules of international law concerning exercises of Governmental 
powers, including military powers and expropriations, within a sovereign state’s borders affecting the 
property or person of aliens. However, more discernible rules of international law have emerged with 
regard to the commercial dealing of private parties in the international market.”).  
 Discussing the effect such a trend should have on a court’s analysis, the Court in Banco Nacional 
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964), stated that  
the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of 
international law, the more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, 
since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to circumstances of 
fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the 
national interest or with international justice. 
 36. Tate Letter, supra note 32, at 985 (noting that, in addition to the United States, ten of thirteen 
signatories to the Brussels Convention of 1926 “have already relinquished by treaty or in practice an 
important part of the immunity which they claim under the classical theory”). 
 37. Id.; Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703–04 (“Of equal importance is the fact that subjecting 
foreign governments to the rule of law in their commercial dealings presents a much smaller risk of 
affronting their sovereignty than would an attempt to pass on the legality of their governmental acts. In 
their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. 
Instead, they exercise only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them 
in connection with such acts to the same rules of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to touch 
very sharply on ‘national nerves.’”) (citation omitted). 
 38. Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689–90 (2004). 
 39. Id. The Court noted several inter-related problems. First, foreign nations would often place 
undue diplomatic pressure upon the State Department, which would then file “suggestions” with the 
court. Second, immunity determinations became troublesome for courts when either foreign nations 
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B. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
Following several years of study, draft bills, and minor technical 
improvements, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act40 
(FSIA) in 197641 with the intent to correct the problems and deficiencies 
of the old regime.42 The FSIA accomplishes several objectives,43 two of 
which are of primary importance here: first, the FSIA codifies the doctrine 
of restrictive immunity; second, it transfers immunity determinations 
squarely from executive departments to the judicial branch.44 
The structure of the FSIA, in particular section 1604,45 presupposes 
immunity for the foreign sovereign.46 Nonetheless, following this grant of 
statutory immunity are several provisions which set forth the exceptions 
under which a court of the United States may exercise jurisdiction over a 
foreign government.47 
C. International Organizations Immunities Act 
Thirty years earlier, at the conclusion of World War II and before 
issuance of the Tate Letter, absolute immunity was still the predominant 
theory to which the United States and the international community 
adhered. This period also saw an increased presence and participation of 
international organizations in international affairs.48 In order to address a 
 
 
failed to request immunity from the State Department or the Secretary failed or refused to file 
recommendations with the court. Third, with the aforementioned problems in mind, the determinations 
of immunity would be made in two separate branches of government without clear or uniform 
standards. See id. at 690–91. 
 40. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 9–10. 
 42. Id. at 6–7. 
 43. The FSIA codifies the restrictive principle of sovereign immunity, ensures that this principle 
is applied in litigation before U.S. courts, provides for statutory procedures for obtaining in personam 
jurisdiction over foreign states, and conforms the execution immunity rules more closely to the 
jurisdictional immunity rules. Id. at 7–8. 
 44. Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 689, 691 (2004). See also Kathleen Cully, Note, Jurisdictional 
Immunities of Intergovermental Organizations, 91 YALE L.J. 1167, 1172 (1982). 
 45. The text of § 1604 reads as follows: “Subject to existing international agreements to which 
the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be immune from 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 
to 1607 of this chapter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2000). 
 46. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17. See also Altmann, 541 U.S. at 691 (“[T]he Act carves out 
certain exceptions to its general grant of immunity . . . .”). 
 48. Thomas J. O’Toole, Sovereign Immunity Redivivus: Suits Against International 
Organizations, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. J. 1, 1 (1980). 
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perceived lack of protection for these newly emerging bodies, Congress 
passed the International Organizations Immunities Act49 (IOIA) in 1945.50 
The central function of the IOIA was to grant international organizations 
“privileges and immunities of a governmental nature.”51 
By conferring these privileges and immunities upon recognized 
international organizations,52 the United States accomplished several 
important goals. Such legislation served the self-interest of the United 
States53 and satisfied a likely condition precedent to the establishment of 
the headquarters of the United Nations in the United States.54 Moreover, 
enactment of a law immunizing international organizations brought the 
United States in line with other nations’55 actions to address the same 
problems.56 
Herein lies the central problem. Given this bifurcated immunity 
scheme—one statute for foreign sovereigns and another for international 
organizations, the latter granting unqualified immunity—can the UNMIK 
police officers sue the United Nations? The answer to this question must 
be in the affirmative.  
 
 
 49. International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), Pub. L. No. 79-291, 59 Stat. 669 (1945) 
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 288–288k (2007)). 
 50. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 946–47 (1945), reprinted in 1945 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 946 
(“[I]n cases where this Government associates itself with one or more foreign governments in an 
international organization, there exists at the present time no law of the United States whereby this 
country can extend privileges of a governmental character with respect to international organizations 
or their official in this country. It is to fill this need that this bill has been presented.”). 
 51. Id. at 946. 
 52. In order to qualify as an international organization under the IOIA, the entity must be public 
in character and one in which  
the United States participates pursuant to any treaty or under the authority of any Act of 
Congress authorizing such participation or making an appropriation for such participation, 
and which shall have been designated by the President through appropriate Executive order as 
being entitled to enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities herein provided. 
22 U.S.C. § 288 (2000). 
 53. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 947 (“[T]he self-interest of this Government in legislation of this 
character is twofold since such legislation will not only protect the official character of public 
international organizations located in this country but it will also tend to strengthen the position of 
international organizations of which the United States is a member when they are located or carry on 
activities in other countries.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. The legislative history of the IOIA specifically identified the governments of Switzerland, 
Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands as having taken some action regarding international 
organizations. Id. at 947–48. 
 56. Id. 
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III. RATIONALES FOR APPLICATION OF THE FSIA TO INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
A. The IOIA, FSIA, and Statutory Construction 
1. The “Plain Meaning” Rule 
The Supreme Court has clearly articulated that in the construction of a 
statute, a court should initially rely on the text of the statute itself.57 “As in 
all statutory construction cases, [a court must] begin with the language of 
the statute. The first step ‘is to determine whether the language at issue has 
a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in 
the case.’”58 If the statutory language is unambiguous, no further inquiry is 
warranted.59 
The immunity-granting provision of the IOIA60 provides that 
“[i]nternational organizations . . . shall enjoy the same immunity . . . as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments . . . .”61 On its face, the language of the 
provision is so unmistakable and singularly self-explanatory that the 
phrase is capable of only one interpretation: the immunity possessed by 
international organizations is neither greater nor less than whatever 
immunity is possessed by foreign governments.62 
 
 
 57. John Paul Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1373, 1374 (1992) (“The Supreme Court has reminded us over and over again that when federal judges 
are required to interpret acts of Congress, they must begin by reading the text of the statute. As one 
rather weary opinion writer has repeatedly explained, ‘[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.’” (quoting Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984))). See generally NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:1 (7th ed. 
2007), Vol. 2A (noting a variety of expressions which explain the plain meaning rule). 
 58. Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 
519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) (2000). 
 61. Id. (emphasis added). The full text of the statute provides that  
[i]nternational organizations, their property and their assets, wherever located, and by 
whomsoever held, shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process 
as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may 
expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any 
contract. 
Id. 
 62. O’Toole, supra note 48, at 11–12 (“The overriding Congressional intent which springs from 
a reading of the immunity provisions of the Act is that international organizations and foreign 
sovereigns shall be treated the same.”). Contra Gordon H. Glenn, Mary M. Kearney & David J. 
Padilla, Immunities of International Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT’L L. 247, 256 (1981–82) (“Purely as 
a matter of logic, this language is susceptible of two interpretations. Either it grants to international 
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Yet, despite the use of this patently unambiguous language, the 
provision has been repeatedly questioned by legal scholars nearly from its 
inception,63 and largely overlooked by the courts.64 Working under the 
premise that the statutory language at issue is capable of more than one 
interpretation, a court’s analysis will typically involve some review of 
legislative history in an effort to discern Congressional intent.65 It is upon 
this generalization that opponents of the “plain meaning” rule have relied 
in rejection of the idea that the FSIA altered the absolute immunity 
scheme originally propounded by the IOIA. 
 
 
organizations the absolute immunity enjoyed by foreign sovereigns in 1945, or the restrictive 
immunity presently applicable under the FSIA.”). 
 63. Glenn et al., supra note 62, at 248 (“[T]he unfortunate shorthand employed by the drafters of 
the IOIA has generated considerable confusion over the precise scope of international organizations’ 
immunities ever since 1952.”). 
 64. Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim (Rendall II), 932 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D.D.C. 1996) (“Courts that 
have been presented with this question have avoided deciding it on the basis that the particular 
international organization at issue was immune from suit whether or not the FSIA applied.”). See, e.g., 
Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 32–33 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting but not deciding this 
issue of statutory construction); Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim (Rendall III), 107 F.3d 913, 916–17 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997) (same). But see Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (“[D]espite the lack of clear instruction as to whether Congress meant to incorporate in the IOIA 
subsequent changes to the law of immunity of foreign sovereigns, Congress’ intent was to adopt that 
body of law only as it existed in 1945—when immunity of foreign sovereigns was absolute.”). 
 65. See, e.g., Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“[I]t is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress’ true intent 
when interpreting its work product.”); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1980) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he ‘plain meaning’ rule is not as inflexible as the Court imagines. Although plain 
meaning is always the starting point, this Court rarely ignores available aids to statutory construction. 
We have recognized consistently that statutes are to be interpreted not only by a consideration of the 
words themselves, but by considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the 
circumstances under which the words were employed.”) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted). But see, e.g., Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510–11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
part) (“[I]f legislative history is relevant when it confirms the plain meaning of the statutory text, it 
should also be relevant when it contradicts the plain meaning, thus rendering what is plain 
ambiguous. . . . [T]he use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of 
any statute—and especially a statute that is clear on its face . . . .”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah 
Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (“Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into 
legislative understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious 
criticisms. First, legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. Judicial 
investigation of legislative history has a tendency to become, to borrow Judge Leventhal’s memorable 
phrase, an exercise in ‘‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’’ Second, judicial reliance 
on legislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the requirements of 
Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and 
lobbyists—both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to 
secure results they were unable to achieve through the statutory text.”) (citation omitted). 
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2. Discerning Legislative Intent 
As noted by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Ways 
and Means, “[t]he basic purpose of [the IOIA] is to confer upon 
international organizations and officials and employees thereof, privileges 
and immunities of a governmental nature.”66 According to the drafters of 
the IOIA, these privileges and immunities were only considered to be 
similar to those immunities granted to foreign governments and officials.67 
Referring to specific language within the committee report, these same 
opponents emphasize that the immunity granted to international 
organizations is only “similar to” that of foreign states,68 and then only “of 
a governmental character.”69 Apparently, the gist of this argument seems 
to be that since the language in the legislative history is somehow textually 
different from the statutory language,70 Congress could only have intended 
to confer upon international organizations immunity comparable to, but 
not equivalent or identical to, that which is enjoyed by foreign states.71 
This argument does find some support in the statement by the committee 
“that the privileges to which international organizations . . . will be entitled 
are somewhat more limited than those which are extended by the United 
States to foreign governments.”72 However, even if this statement is taken 
 
 
 66. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 946. 
 67. Id. at 950. 
 68. Cully, supra note 44, at 1171–72; Richard J. Oparil, Immunity of International Organizations 
in United States Courts: Absolute or Restrictive?, 24 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 705–06 (1991). 
 69. Cully, supra note 44, at 1171–72; H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 947. 
 70. Compare supra note 61 and accompanying text with supra text accompanying notes 66–67. 
 71. Oparil, supra note 68, at 705–06. Oparil further cites to particular language within the 
committee report to bolster this argument: “this legislation has the advantage of setting forth in one 
place all of the specific privileges which international organizations will enjoy.” Id. (citing H.R. REP. 
NO. 79-1203, at 950) (emphasis added). The inference desired from this committee language could 
only be that the laws concerning immunity for international organizations must somehow be 
encapsulated in a single statutory scheme. Thus, what Oparil essentially argues is that the legislative 
actions of later sessions of Congress are forever bound by the legislative undertakings of earlier 
sessions of Congress and cannot, for example, arrange the laws concerning immunity for international 
organizations among multiple statutes or arrive at a desired effect through piecemeal legislation. This 
is undeniably inaccurate. “[U]nder well-established constitutional precedent, . . . an act of Congress 
. . . does not bind future Congresses. Like any other act of Congress it may be repealed, modified, or 
amended at the unilateral will of future Congresses.” United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 
1172–73 (1st Cir. 1987) (Torruella, J., concurring) (“To be sure, Congress is generally free to change 
its mind; in amending legislation Congress is not bound by the intent of an earlier body. But it is 
bound by the Constitution.” (citing Cmty.-Serv. Broad. of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102, 
1113 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Skelly-Wright, C.J.)). 
 72. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 950–51 (emphasis added). This committee statement should not be 
taken literally, because if the statement is accurate, the statutory language—specifically, the use of the 
word “same” when referring to the relationship of the immunity of international organizations to that 
of foreign states in § 288a(b)—would become meaningless. To hold otherwise would violate the 
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at face value, the argument becomes self-defeating since any immunity 
different from the absolute immunity enjoyed by foreign nations is, by its 
very nature, less than absolute.73 Moreover, any implication that the 
language in a committee report somehow supersedes the statutory 
language is inappropriate as “Congress [has] never enacted the language of 
[a] House Report . . . .”74 
Of the more commonly asserted reasons given by opponents of any 
analysis of the IOIA utilizing the “plain meaning” rule is that the structure 
of the Act clearly signifies Congressional intent to retain the pre-FSIA 
doctrine of absolute immunity for international organizations.75 Support 
for this argument is allegedly found in the IOIA provision which grants 
the president discretionary power to unilaterally modify the immunity of 
an international organization.76 Admittedly, this provision “may indicate 
 
 
“cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed 
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” 
TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also, e.g., United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 
(1955) (“It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (“We are thus reluctant to treat 
statutory terms as surplusage in any setting. We are especially unwilling to do so when the term 
occupies so pivotal a place in the statutory scheme . . . .”) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 73. Recall that, at the time of issuance of this statement, foreign nations were accorded absolute 
immunity. In the alternative, the statement in the legislative history can be viewed as merely drawing a 
distinction between the quantity of immunity granted to international organizations and the quality of 
immunity so granted. In 1946, Congress, inter alia, granted absolute immunity to “[i]nternational 
organizations, their property and their assets . . . from suit and every form of judicial process” and 
further provided that the “[p]roperty and assets of international organizations . . . shall be immune 
from search . . . and from confiscation.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b), (c). In the qualitative sense, Congress 
could have accorded these same categories with some amount of immunity less than absolute. In a 
quantitative sense, Congress could have limited an international organization’s absolute immunity to, 
for example, only suits, but not from search or confiscation. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,425, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 28,069 (June 16, 1983) (immunity of property and assets of Interpol denied as to search and 
confiscation but retaining absolute immunity from suit). 
 74. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting in part); see also Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n, 466 F.3d 134, 
139 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“[A] committee report is not law . . . .”); Jones v. Senkowski, 2002 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 2669, at *8 (2d Cir. 2002) (opinion vacated and withdrawn by court) (“Legislative history is 
not ‘the law’ . . . .”). For purposes of this Note, I distinguish between reference to legislative history to 
aid in the interpretation of a statute and reference to legislative history instead of the statute. As the 
latter gives statutory effect to the language in the legislative history, it is always improper. 
 75. Jared Sher, Immunity, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 769, 771 (2000); Cully, supra note 44, at 
1170; Glenn et al., supra note 62, at 256–57. 
 76. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (“The President shall be authorized, in the light of the functions performed 
by any such international organization, by appropriate Executive order to withhold or withdraw from 
any such organization or its officers or employees any of the privileges, exemptions, and immunities 
provided for in this subchapter (including the amendments made by this subchapter) or to condition or 
limit the enjoyment by any such organization or its officers or employees of any such privilege, 
exemption, or immunity. The President shall be authorized, if in his judgment such action should be 
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that Congress perceived the need for such restrictions because the IOIA 
otherwise granted absolute immunity.”77 Nevertheless, while the 
soundness of this explanation is certainly compelling, the original purpose 
of the presidential modification provision is particularly limited in that it 
was intended only to curb abuses by international organizations in their 
commercial activities.78 Given this original purpose, the discretionary 
nature of this authority, and the drastic consequences to an international 
organization upon which this power is employed, the use of this provision 
by the president may not be equitable when the conduct of the 
international organization is only of a non-commercial nature. 
Along similar lines, these opponents further challenge any result based 
upon application of the “plain meaning” rule by emphasizing two aspects 
of the language of the FSIA itself. The first challenge concerns the FSIA’s 
statutory definition of “foreign state,”79 and, in particular, the fact that 
international organizations are not expressly mentioned within this 
definition.80 This argument is unpersuasive. The definition of “foreign 
state” uses inclusive language (i.e., “includes”),81 rather than exclusive 
language (i.e., “means”).82 While the term “includes” may sometimes be 
 
 
justified by reason of the abuse by an international organization or its officers and employees of the 
privileges, exemptions, and immunities herein provided in this subchapter or for any other reason, at 
any time to revoke the designation of any international organization under this section, whereupon the 
international organization in question shall cease to be classed as an international organization for the 
purposes of this subchapter.”). 
 77. Glenn et al., supra note 62, at 257. 
 78. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“The Senate 
Report on the IOIA stated: ‘This provision will permit the adjustment or limitation of the privileges in 
the event that any international organization should engage for example, in activities of a commercial 
nature.’ And in floor debate on the legislation, its supporters pointed again to this provision as a 
limitation on commercial abuses by an international organization. Hence this provision may reveal that 
Congress intended to grant absolute immunity to international organizations and give the President the 
authority to relax that immunity, through removal or restriction of immunity in cases involving the 
commercial activities of international organizations.”) (citations omitted); Atkinson v. Inter-American 
Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Not only does this description of the President’s 
role suggest that responsibility for modifying immunity granted by the IOIA rests with the President 
rather than with an evolving separate body of law . . . , it does so with specific regard to the notion of 
restrictive immunity for commercial activities.”); Lawrence Preuss, The International Organizations 
Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT’L L. 332, 335 (1946). But see H.R. REP. NO. 79-1203, at 948 (“The 
broad powers granted to the President will permit prompt action in connection with any abuse of the 
privileges and immunities granted hereunder or presumably for other reasons such as the conduct of 
improper activities by international organizations in the United States.”). 
 79. Within the FSIA, “[a] ‘foreign state’ . . . includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or 
an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (2000). 
 80. Oparil, supra note 68, at 706. 
 81. “The term ‘includes’ . . . when used in a definition . . . shall not be deemed to exclude other 
things otherwise within the meaning of the term defined.” Commissioner v. Morgan’s Inc., 293 U.S. 
121, 125 n.1 (1934). 
 82. “As a rule, ‘[a] definition which declares what a term ‘means’ . . . excludes any meaning that 
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taken as synonymous with “means,” this is not necessarily so.83 “[W]here 
‘means’ is employed, the term and its definition are to be interchangeable 
equivalents, [while] the verb ‘includes’ imports a general class, some of 
whose particular instances are those specified in the definition.”84 Thus, 
the use of the term “includes” within the FSIA definition of “foreign state” 
clearly implies that international organizations are not necessarily 
excluded. 
The second textual challenge concerns the fact that the FSIA (and its 
legislative history) mentions the IOIA only with respect to a single 
provision.85 This provision retains immunity for property held by 
international organizations and apparently reinforces the idea that 
Congress did not alter the immunity of international organizations.86 This 
belief is strongly supported by a statement in the committee report that 
“[t]he reference to ‘international organizations’ in this subsection is not 
intended to restrict any immunity accorded to such international 
organizations under any other law or international agreement.”87 
Accordingly, as the IOIA is one such “other law” in relation to the FSIA, 
it is clear that Congress did not wish for the FSIA to change the immunity 
originally accorded to international organizations.88  
Setting aside the legal principle that committee reports are not law,89 
reliance on this committee statement is misplaced. First, supporters of this 
textual challenge conveniently ignore other important language in the 
committee statement itself; it is only “this subsection,” i.e., section 
1611(a), that precludes the FSIA from disturbing the IOIA absolute 
 
 
is not stated.” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 n.10 (1979) (citation omitted). 
 83. Morgan’s Inc., 293 U.S. at 125 n.1. 
 84. Id. (suggesting that some instances are mentioned and other instances are not). Given the 
differentiation between “includes” and “means,” my rebuttal argument becomes even more persuasive 
since Congress utilized both terms within § 1603. Compare § 1603(d) (“A ‘commercial activity’ 
means . . . .”) (emphasis added) with § 1603(a). 
 85. This reference states that  
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 1610 of this chapter [concerning the lack of 
immunity for property in the United States held by foreign states used for commercial 
activity], the property of those organizations designated by the President as being entitled to 
enjoy the privileges, exemptions, and immunities provided by the International Organizations 
Immunities Act shall not be subject to attachment or any other judicial process impeding the 
disbursement of funds to, or on the order of, a foreign state as the result of an action brought 
in the courts of the United States or of the States. 
28 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2007). 
 86. See, e.g., Broadbent v. Org. of Am. States, 628 F.2d 27, 31–32 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Oparil, 
supra note 68, at 706–07; Cully, supra note 44, at 1176–77. 
 87. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 31. 
 88. Oparil, supra note 68, at 707. 
 89. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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immunity scheme. Nothing in the committee statement suggests that 
another section could not alter that immunity. Second, the Supreme Court 
has articulated “that legislative history need not confirm the details of 
changes in the law effected by statutory language before [the Court] will 
interpret that language according to its natural meaning.”90 In other words, 
Congress can alter statutes, including immunity-granting statutes, with 
little or no explanation about such change in the legislative history. Lastly, 
because this committee statement has been wrested from its original 
context, its meaning is grossly overstated. Under the IOIA, immunity is 
granted to two distinct classes: international organizations and their 
property and assets.91 Yet, the FSIA provision and its corresponding 
legislative history only relate to the property and assets of international 
organizations. Indeed, “[t]he purpose of this subsection is to permit 
international organizations . . . to carry out their function from their offices 
located in the United States without hindrance by private claimants 
seeking to attach the payment of funds to a foreign state . . . .”92 Had 
Congress wanted to secure absolute immunity for international 
organizations as a whole, the emphasized language would have been 
superfluous. Its inclusion, therefore, must signify the maximum extent of 
the restriction on the immunity of international organizations. Similarly, it 
seems that if Congress wanted to have the effect that has been argued, why 
would Congress relegate placement of this so-called immunity-saving 
statement to its current location which pertains exclusively to property, 
when placement in some other location would more likely have the 
“intended” effect?93 
One final reason given for rejecting any conclusion based solely upon 
the plain language of the IOIA is the subsequent introduction of Senate 
 
 
 90. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 385 n.2 (1992). 
 91. See supra notes 60–61. 
 92. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 30 (emphasis added). 
 93. Since Congress was undoubtedly aware of the IOIA when it drafted and enacted the FSIA, it 
seems likely that Congress would have foreseen, and consequently avoided, potential problems 
involving the statutory construction of the FSIA by amending the IOIA accordingly. See O’Toole, 
supra note 48, at 11 (“One can certainly argue that if Congress intended to ossify the immunities of 
international organizations it could easily have so declared by adding the words ‘as of the date of this 
Act’ to the clause ‘. . . shall enjoy the same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments.’”). But see Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 
1342 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (expressly rejecting this argument). For an example of such ossification, see 
supra note 45.  
 “An even more obvious and preferable solution would be an express legislative statement in the 
original incorporating statute [the IOIA] as to whether later changes in the incorporated measure are 
also adopted.” R. Perry Sentell, Jr., “Reference Statutes”—Borrow Now and Pay Later?, 10 GA. L. 
REV. 153, 155 n.9 (1975).  
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Bill 2715.94 Fourteen years after the FSIA became effective, Senator Roth 
of Delaware proposed legislation which would have expressly defined the 
immunity granted to international organizations by the IOIA as equivalent 
to that conferred by the FSIA upon foreign governments.95 The proposal of 
this amendment implies that the enactment of the FSIA could not have 
originally altered the immunity granted to international organizations 
under the IOIA. After all, if Congress thought the FSIA actually altered 
the immunity granted to international organizations, why would a Senate 
amendment stating the same be necessary? Certainly, such an inference is 
logical since, in rejecting passage of Senator Roth’s amendment,96 
Congress may have desired that international organizations continue to 
enjoy absolute immunity; however, this assumption ignores three 
important qualifications. First, “Congress does not express its intent by a 
failure to legislate.”97 Second, the acts or views of a single Senator do not 
necessarily reflect those of the entire body of Congress.98 Third, one could 
also logically infer that Congress did not see a need for any such 
amendment since the IOIA by its language already had the effect put forth 
by the amendment. 
While looking to Congressional intent may, at times, be useful, doing 
so overlooks the dilemma that occurs when legislative intent is either 
inconclusive or, as demonstrated above, interpreted in such a manner that 
 
 
 94. Oparil, supra note 68, at 707. 
 95. The text of S. 2715 is as follows:  
Be it enacted . . . , That . . . the International Organizations Immunities Act . . . is amended—
. . . by adding at the end [of § 288a(b)] the following new paragraph: “(2) For purposes of this 
subsection, the phrase ‘same immunity from suit and every form of judicial process as is 
enjoyed by foreign governments’ means the same immunity to which foreign states are 
entitled under sections 1605 through 1607 of title 28, United States Code.” 
S. 2715, 101st Cong. (1990). The bill also sought to amend the definition of “foreign state” in the 
FSIA, located at 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), by inserting the phrase “or any international organization” 
before the period. Id. 
 96. In fact, S. 2715 was not expressly rejected. The bill was introduced on the floor and referred 
to the Committee on Judiciary on June 7, 1990. The proposed amendment was later referred to the 
Subcommittee on Courts and Administrative Practice on September 9, 1990, without further action. 
Library of Congress / THOMAS: Bills, Resolutions, http://thomas.loc.gov/bss/101search.html (search 
“international organizations immunities act”). 
 97. Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1342 (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 535 
(1998) (Scalia, J. concurring)). 
 98. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“[U]sing 
committee reports and other such sources . . . accustoms us to believing that what is said by a single 
person in a floor debate or by a committee report represents the view of Congress as a whole—so that 
we sometimes even will say (when referring to a floor statement and committee report) that ‘Congress 
has expressed’ thus-and-so. There is no basis either in law or in reality for this naive belief.”) (citation 
omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] HOLDING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ACCOUNTABLE 635 
 
 
 
 
incongruency results.99 As the Supreme Court has been apt to point out, it 
is appropriate to utilize canons of statutory construction when nothing in 
the text, legislative history, or underlying policies100 clearly resolves the 
statutory ambiguity.101 One such canon seems appropriate here. 
3. Application of the “Reference” Canon 
When proposing, drafting, and enacting new legislation, lawmakers 
often incorporate or adopt by reference portions of earlier statutes.102 This 
process is called “incorporation by reference” and the borrowing 
legislation is typically considered to be a “reference statute.”103 “There are 
 
 
 99. For an example of clearly incongruent legislative history, see Verlinden B.V. v.  
Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 489 (1983), in which the Court decided that the FSIA also pertains 
to foreign plaintiffs. The Court reached this conclusion despite contrasting language in the legislative 
history of the FSIA. In one part, the Act provides jurisdiction for “any claim,” while in another part, 
the Act merely “ensure[s] [American] citizens” have access to the courts. Id. at 490. This example 
demonstrates why the use of legislative history is so highly contentious. See supra note 65. 
 100. The policy rationale for granting absolute immunity to international organizations stems from 
the belief that such immunity is necessary to protect the organization from biased local courts, 
interference by “host” governments, frivolous suits, “and the possibility that Member States would 
interpret the legal effects of their acts in different, and possibly inconsistent, ways.” Carla Bongiorno, 
A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the United Nations in East Timor, 
33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 663 (2002).  
 While serious, these concerns overlook several important aspects of the law. First, application of 
the FSIA is always subordinate to existing treaties. See supra note 45; see also, e.g., Moore v. U.K., 
384 F.3d 1079, 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the dismissal of FSIA claim due to lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction where pre-existing treaty (NATO-SOFA) supersedes and precludes FSIA). 
At least with respect to the United Nations, the U.N. Charter specifically provides that “[t]he 
Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.” U.N. Charter, art. 105, para. 1. Thus, if the conduct that 
caused the injury is a necessary function of the United Nations, there can be no legitimate interference 
by host governments.  
 Next, the argument that international organizations need to be protected from biased local courts 
is tenuous. It would be strange indeed if “foreign” international organizations somehow required more 
protection from “biased” courts than would equally “foreign” foreign sovereigns. Phrased differently, 
why would foreign nations, who are subjected to the FSIA, need any less protection from local courts 
than would international organizations for exactly the same conduct?  
 Additionally, the claim that international organizations need protection from frivolous suits is 
wholly without merit. While international organizations and governments alike are subjected to such 
suits, a court can efficiently and effectively act as a gatekeeper, separating frivolous suits from 
otherwise valid claims. See, e.g., Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per 
curiam) (dismissing sixteen appeals as frivolous and noting dismissal of eleven previous appeals also 
as frivolous). 
 101. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 99 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). But 
see, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 263 (1994) (“It is not uncommon to find 
‘apparent tension’ between different canons of statutory construction. As Professor Llewellyn 
famously illustrated, many of the traditional canons have equal opposites.”). 
 102. Sentell, supra note 93, at 153–54. 
 103. Id. at 154. 
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two general types of reference statutes: statutes of specific reference and 
statutes of general reference.”104 
“A statute of specific reference . . . refers . . . to a particular statute by 
its title or section number,” whereas a statute of general reference “refers 
to the law on the subject generally.”105 
A statute of specific reference incorporates the provisions referred 
to from the statute as of the time of adoption without subsequent 
amendments, unless the legislature has expressly or by strong 
implication shown its intention to incorporate subsequent 
amendments with the statute. . . . A statute which refers to a subject 
generally adopts the law on the subject as of the time the law is 
enacted. This will include all the amendments and modifications of 
the law subsequent to the time the reference statute was enacted.106 
This distinction is easily illustrated. In United States v. Griner,107 the 
court was required to determine whether a Congressional “bookkeeping” 
error prohibited a sentencing court from imposing a post-imprisonment 
discretionary condition upon the probationer-defendant.108 As part of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,109 Congress provided in section 3583(d) 
that, as a condition of supervised release, a court may impose “any 
[discretionary] condition set forth . . . in section 3563(b)(1) through 
(b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(19) . . . .”110 In 1996, Congress amended 
3563(b) by removing one subsection and renumbering the remaining 
conditions, causing subsection (b)(12)—the condition in question—to 
become subsection (b)(11).111 However, Congress failed to amend section 
3583(d), i.e., the reference provision, which still excluded subsection 
 
 
 104. 2B NORMAN J.SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTITUTION § 51.07 (6th ed. 2006). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. § 51.08 (footnotes omitted). According to one author, “[u]nder general principles of 
statutory construction, a statute incorporating the general law on a subject also incorporates subsequent 
changes in that law, whereas a reference to a body of general law in a statute dealing with a specific 
separate issue has no such effect.” Cully, supra note 44, at 1177 (emphasis added). As the italicized 
language demonstrates, the canon has been slightly mischaracterized as it pertains to specific 
references. A statute of specific reference does not refer to “a body of general law in a statute dealing 
with a specific separate issue”; rather, a statute of specific reference refers solely to another statute. 
 107. United States v. Griner, 358 F.3d 979 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 108. Id. at 981–82. 
 109. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at §§ 3563, 
3583). 
 110. Id. at 1999–2000. 
 111. Griner, 358 F.3d at 981–82 (citing Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-
132, § 203(2), 110 Stat. 1227). Subsection (b)(12) required the defendant to “reside at, or participate in 
the program of, a community corrections facility for all or part of the term of probation . . . .” 98 Stat. 
at 1993. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/8
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] HOLDING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ACCOUNTABLE 637 
 
 
 
 
(b)(11) from the list of permissible discretionary conditions.112 The 
defendant relied on this faulty cross-reference in an attempt to escape the 
residency condition enumerated at subsection (b)(11).113 Relying on a 
“well-settled canon,” the court held that, despite Congress’s error, section 
3583(d) still permitted a court to impose the residency requirement as a 
condition of supervised release.114 According to the court, when section 
3583(d) originally referenced the various provisions in section 3563(b), it 
was as if those provisions were made a part of section 3583(d). Thus 
section 3583(d) “included the language of subsection (b)(12) as it was 
then written to permit community-corrections confinement.”115 
Contrast the reference statute in Griner with that contained in the Alien 
Tort Statute,116 which grants original jurisdiction to U.S. district courts for 
“any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the 
law of nations . . . .”117 What exactly is the “law of nations,” and what torts 
violate this “amorphous entity”?118 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,119 the court 
of appeals addressed these “threshold” questions when it addressed the 
issue of whether torture constituted a violation of international law.120 
Although the court did not rely on any canons in reaching its decision, the 
end result would have been the same—international law must be 
“interpret[ed] . . . not as it was in 1789 [when the statute was enacted],[121] 
but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”122 
 
 
 112. Griner, 358 F.3d at 982. 
 113. Id. at 981. Essentially, defendant asserts that because section 3583(d) does not permit a court 
to impose subsection (b)(11) as a discretionary condition and the community-corrections residency 
condition is currently codified at subsection (b)(11), a sentencing court may not require a defendant to 
stay at such a facility.  
 114. Id. at 982. The “well settled canon” to which the court referred was used by the Supreme 
Court in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314 (1938) (quoting 2 SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION 787–88 (2d ed. 1904)), and paralleled the language of the canon used here.  
 115. Id. (emphasis added). 
 116. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). The full text of the statute is as follows: “The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.” Id. 
 118. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., 
concurring). I use Judge Edwards’ descriptive phrase to strongly denote that the “law of nations” is a 
general reference. Indeed, can an “amorphous entity” ever be specific?  
 119. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 120. Id. at 880. These questions necessarily imply that torture was not thought to be contrary to 
the law of nations when the statute was first codified in 1789; otherwise, the court could have avoided 
the issue altogether. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 720 (2004) (finding that the “law of 
nations” in 1789 consisted of only three offenses: offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe 
conduct, and piracy). 
 121. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712–13 (citations omitted). 
 122. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881. 
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This conclusion necessarily reaffirms the principle embodied by the 
canon: a reference to a general body of law includes amendments and 
changes to that law since the time of the reference.123 
A comparison of the reference statutes in Griner and Filartiga 
demonstrates that, as one judge has observed, a general reference 
“envisage[s] a systematic structure rather than an isolated statutory 
fragment, a forest rather than a single tree, a tree rather than a single 
leaf.”124  
Returning to the IOIA statute at issue here, an analysis of the 
“borrowing” language in § 288a(b)—“shall enjoy the same immunity . . . 
as . . . foreign governments”—confirms that it fails to mention any 
particular statute either by title or section number. Doing so would have 
definitively made the IOIA a statute of specific reference as defined and 
exemplified above. Instead, the IOIA refers to the law on a subject 
generally: immunity for foreign governments.125 
4. Summary 
Since the legislative intent of either statute has proven to be of such 
highly questionable value in the construction of the FSIA, it seems wholly 
appropriate to resort to canons of statutory construction, in particular the 
“reference” canon, to aid in a proper interpretation. Utilization of this 
canon reveals that when the degree of immunity granted to foreign nations 
was modified by the FSIA, the extent of immunity granted to international 
organizations was likewise changed.126 Consequently, the absolute 
immunity originally enjoyed by international organizations, including the 
United Nations, is no longer applicable, having been replaced by the 
doctrine of restrictive immunity.127 
 
 
 123. See also, e.g., Somermeier v. Dist. Dir. of Customs for the Port of Los Angeles—Long 
Beach, 448 F.2d 1243, 1244 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that state statute that referenced “existing 
provisions of federal law” meant law as it was “changed from time to time” and not as it existed when 
first enacted). 
 124. Clark v. Crown Constr. Co., 887 F.2d 149, 152 (8th Cir. 1989) (Dumbauld, J., sitting by 
designation) (finding that a reference to the Longshoremen’s Act was a general reference). For an 
example of a statute that contains elements of both general and specific references, see Morgan v. 
Robinson, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1141–43 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 125. See Atkinson v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 156 F.3d 1335, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998) 
(“Obviously, the 1945 Congress was legislating in shorthand, referring to another body of law—the 
law governing the immunity of foreign governments—to define the scope of the new immunity for 
international organizations.”). 
 126. Rendall-Sperenza v. Nassim (Rendall II), 932 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D.D.C. 1996). Contra 
Atkinson, 156 F.3d at 1341. 
 127. The United States has taken the same position: International organizations are entitled only to 
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Nevertheless, even if the doctrine of absolute immunity granted to 
international organizations could not have been replaced by the theory of 
restrictive immunity promulgated by the FSIA, there exists, as a 
consequence of the establishment of UNMIK, another independent basis 
for finding that the organization should only be accorded immunity under 
the FSIA’s restrictive immunity structure. 
B. International Organizations as “States” 
1. A Short History of International Organizations 
International organizations first began appearing in the late nineteenth 
century and were primarily concerned with matters related to the public 
health, postal system, and telecommunications.128 In the early twentieth 
century, international organizations entered the political arena, organized 
primarily for international peace and security.129 
As a prime example, the League of Nations was established in 1919 
under the auspices of the Treaty of Versailles “[i]n order to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security 
. . . .”130 Having been unable to prevent the onset of World War II, the 
League of Nations “faded into the twilight.”131 Yet, for all of the League’s 
failings, “men of vision set themselves to the task of creating a new 
charter for international collaboration.”132 This task was finally 
accomplished in 1945, when the United Nations officially came into 
existence after ratification of its charter by fifty countries, including China, 
France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States.133 
 
 
the restrictive immunity granted by the FSIA. Letter from Robert B. Owen, Legal Adviser, Department 
of State, to Leroy D. Clark, General Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (June 24, 
1980), reprinted in Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 917, 917–18 (1980); see also Broadbent v. Org. of Am States, 
628 F.2d 27, 31 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that the United States as amicus curiae supported the idea that 
the FSIA amended the immunity granted to international organizations). 
 128. Christoph Schreuer, The Changing Structure of International Organization, 11 TRANSNAT’L 
LAW. 419, 420 (1998); History of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/aboutun/unhistory (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. History]. 
 129. Schreuer, supra note 128, at 420; O’Toole, supra note 48, at 1 (“[T]hese new entities . . . 
exercise a political, economic and social influence of massive importance.”). 
 130. League of Nations Covenant pmbl., reprinted in GERARD J. MANGONE, A SHORT HISTORY 
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 157 (1954). 
 131. MANGONE, supra note 130, at 153–54. The Assembly of the League of Nations was officially 
disbanded on April 6, 1946, when all remaining assets were transferred to the United Nations. Id. at 
175. 
 132. Id. at 154. 
 133. U.N. History, supra note 128. 
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2. Changing Characteristics of the United Nations 
The primary responsibility of the United Nations has generally been 
construed as “the maintenance of international peace and security.”134 This 
responsibility, however, was rarely fulfilled during the Cold War.135 With 
the end of the Cold War, this responsibility has been supplanted by a more 
proactive role in intra-national peace and security,136 to the extent that the 
protection of human rights has become a responsibility shared between the 
principle state and the international community, with primary 
responsibility for such protection belonging to the state.137 
However, “where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of 
internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in 
question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention[138] yields to the international responsibility to protect.”139 
Justification for disregarding the principle of non-intervention seems to be 
rooted in the idea that any state that would allow its citizens to suffer 
thereby forfeits any moral claim to be treated as legitimate; consequently 
any rights to sovereignty or non-intervention are suspended.140 When such 
 
 
 134. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1; see Siobhan Wills, The Need for Effective Protection of United 
Nations Peacekeepers: The Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, 
HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2003, at 26. 
 135. See Julianne Peck, Note, The U.N. and the Laws of War: How Can the World’s Peacekeepers 
Be Held Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 283, 284 (1995); Wills, supra note 134, at 26 
(“[T]he UN Charter provides for coercive measures to compel states to comply with resolutions taken 
by the Security Council. These coercive measures require achieving and maintaining a consensus 
among the permanent members of the Security Council. As a result of the divisions of the Cold War, 
effective action by the Security Council was blocked . . . .”). 
 136. Wills, supra note 134, at 26 (“In recent years, the traditionally passive role engendered by 
such [peacekeeping] missions has been replaced by a more active role of peace making involving, 
inter alia, national reconstruction, facilitating transition to democracy, and providing humanitarian 
assistance.”); see also Susan L. Turley, Note, Keeping the Peace: Do the Laws of War Apply?, 73 TEX. 
L. REV. 139, 140 (1994) (“With the Cold War evidently over, peacekeeping missions have been thrust 
into a position of international prominence. . . . [T]he number of such undertakings has exploded 
recently: between 1989 and 1993, the United Nations mounted as many peacekeeping deployments as 
it did during its first forty-three years.”). In fact, during the period from 1948 until 1989, there were 
eighteen peacekeeping operations, whereas during the period from 1990 until 2007, there were forty-
three peacekeeping operations. U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Timeline, http://www.un.org/ 
Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/timeline.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2007). 
 137. Siobhan Wills, Military Interventions on Behalf of Vulnerable Populations: The Legal 
Responsibilities of States and International Organizations Engaged in Peace Support Operations, 9 J. 
CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 387, 391 (2004) (citing DANISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS 45 (1999)). 
 138. “The principle of non-intervention involves the right of every sovereign State to conduct its 
affairs without outside interference . . . .” Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, 106 (June 27). 
 139. Wills, supra note 137, at 391. 
 140. Id. at 392. 
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intervention for the purpose of humanitarian concern is required by an 
external body, a presumption must arise whereby “a new relationship 
should come into being between the protected population and its 
protectors.”141 I assert that just such a relationship existed between the 
people of Kosovo and their protector—the United Nations. 
3. The United Nations Has Assumed the Role of a State 
Subsequent to NATO’s142 seventy-seven day long bombing campaign 
to stop Serbian attacks on ethnic Kosovar Albanians that ended in June 
1999,143 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1244.144 
With the implementation of this resolution, the United Nations seized 
control of Kosovo in an effort to remedy the chaos occurring within.145 
Regardless of whether the Yugoslav Republic voluntarily acquiesced in 
this transition of power,146 without a doubt, this resolution ousted the 
 
 
 141. Id. at 393. 
 142. “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North 
America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty . . . .” What is 
NATO?, http://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2008). 
 143. Garentina Kraja, Kosovo Takes First Small Steps Toward Sovereignty, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Feb. 3, 2007, at A24. Following World War II, Kosovo became a province of Serbia within 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since 1974 and continuing beyond the effective dissolution of the 
socialist Yugoslav Republic between 1991 and 1992, Kosovo enjoyed substantial autonomy. When 
Slobodan Milosevic gained power in 1989, and playing upon the fears of ethnic Serbs living in the 
Albanian-majority province, Kosovar autonomy was eliminated in favor of more direct rule from 
Belgrade. Opposed to this change in the status quo, ethnic Albanians desired to form an independent 
republic—first by peaceful movements with subsequent escalation to armed resistance. In 1998, 
Milosevic ordered Serbian forces into Kosovo and armed open conflict resulted. It was this conflict 
which prompted NATO action. U.S. Dept. of State, Bureau of European & Eurasian Affairs, 
Background Note: Serbia, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2007); 
NATO & Kosovo: Historical Overview, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 
2007). 
 144. Bernhard Knoll, From Benchmarking to Final Status? Kosovo and the Problem of an 
International Administration’s Open-Ended Mandate, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 637, 638 (2005); S.C. Res. 
1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
 145. A provision of S.C. Res. 1244:  
[a]uthorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, 
to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim 
administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy 
within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration 
while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing 
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo.  
S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 144, ¶ 10. 
 146. Is submission after a seventy-seven-day bombing campaign voluntary? Compare S.C. Res. 
1244, supra note 144, Annex 2, ¶ 10 (stating that “[s]uspension of military activity will require 
acceptance of the principles set forth . . .” suggesting, at least to this author, coercion) (emphasis 
added) with Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 UCLA J. INT’L 
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legitimate government147 from the territory and installed the United 
Nations as the de facto state authority.148 
a. Statehood as a Result of Functionality 
Among the duties and responsibilities assumed by this new 
administration—duties normally undertaken by traditional nation-states—
are the performance of basic civilian administrative functions, the 
reconstruction of the infrastructure and economy, and the maintenance of 
civil law and order, including local police protection.149 As one legal 
scholar has commented: the “assumption of functional statehood [by 
international organizations] is incremental and spread over a variety of 
issues, such as treaty making, functional recognition of newcomers into 
the international community, public services, economic regulation, peace 
and security, lawmaking, adjudication, and protection of individuals.”150 
Since the adoption of Resolution 1244, UNMIK has entered into 
international agreements with neighboring countries,151 enacted 
regulations pertaining to the revitalization of the economy,152 established 
 
 
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 385, 390 & n.6, 398 (2003) (contending that acquiescence to intervention is 
consent and Yugoslavia acquiesced to United Nations intervention). 
 147. Ralph Wilde, Note, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International 
Territorial Administration, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 594 (2001) (“[UNMIK] replace[d] the Serb and 
FRY governments, which in 1999 opposed any alteration in Kosovo’s status.”). See also supra note 
143. 
 148. Knoll, supra note 144 (“The resolution vested the right to exercise effective control within 
the territory in a UN subsidiary organ—the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK)—thus reducing [the Yugoslav Republic’s] sovereign rights to a nudum jus.”). 
 149. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 144, ¶¶ 11(b), (g), (i); Frederick Rawski, To Waive or Not to 
Waive: Immunity and Accountability in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103, 117 
(2002) (“In their initial stages, both UNMIK and UNTAET [the U.N. Temporary Administration in 
East Timor], as governing authorities, wielded absolute legislative, police and judicial power.”). 
 150. Schreuer, supra note 128, at 421. 
 151. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding on Police Cooperation Between the Government of 
the Republic of Albania and United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, signed Sept. 
9, 2002, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/justice/documents/albpolcoope_eng.pdf; Protocol on 
Police Cooperation Between United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the 
Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, signed May 31, 2002, 
available at http://www.unmikonline.org/justice/documents/PolCoopFRY_Eng.pdf; Letter from 
Branko Bojchevski, Director of the Bureau for Public Security, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of 
Macedonia, to Jean-Christian Cady, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Police 
and Justice, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Nov. 27, 2002) (responding to 
and accepting UNMIK’s proposal regarding an interim protocol on police cooperation), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/justice/documents/PolCoopFYROM_Eng.pdf. 
 To the extent that memoranda or protocols are distinguishable from treaties or other binding 
international agreements, Knoll, supra note 144, at 644, and thus do not establish “formal” 
international relationships, see infra note 179. 
 152. See, e.g., Regulation No. 1999/04 On the Currency Permitted to Be Used in Kosovo, 
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mechanisms for providing public services,153 created laws,154 provided for 
the maintenance of peace and security,155 created means for the protection 
of individuals,156 and provided for the adjudication of disputes.157 
b. Statehood as a Result of International Law 
However, should one aver that this functional approach merely 
establishes that UNMIK is the primary governmental entity in Kosovo (as 
 
 
UNMIK/REG/1999/4 (Sept. 2, 1999), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/ 
re99_04.pdf; Regulation No. 1999/16 On the Establishment of the Central Fiscal Authority of Kosovo 
and Other Related Matters, UNMIK/REG/1999/16 (Nov. 6, 1999), available at http://www.unmik 
online.org/regulations/1999/re99_16.pdf; Regulation No. 1999/20 On the Banking and Payments 
Authority of Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/1999/20 (Nov. 15, 1999), available at http://www.unmikonline. 
org/regulations/1999/re99_20.pdf. 
 153. See, e.g., Regulation No. 1999/12 On the Provision of Postal and Telecommunications 
Services in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/1999/12 (Oct. 14, 1999), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
regulations/1999/re99_12.pdf; Regulation No. 2000/12 On the Establishment of the Administrative 
Department of Public Services, UNMIK/REG/2000/12 (Mar. 14, 2000), available at http://www. 
unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2000regs/RE2000_12.htm; Regulation No. 
2000/49 On the Establishment of the Administrative Department of Public Utilities, 
UNMIK/REG/2000/49 (Aug. 19, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/ 
unmikgazette/02english/E2000regs/RE2000_49.htm. 
 154. See, e.g., Regulation No. 1999/24 On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/1999/24 
(Dec. 12, 1999), amended by Regulation No. 2000/59 (Oct. 27, 2000), available at http://www. 
unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2000regs/RE2000_59.htm; Regulation No. 
2003/25 On the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2003/25 (July 6, 2003), amended 
by Regulation No. 2004/19 (June 16, 2004), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/ 
unmikgazette/02english/E2003regs/RE2003_25.pdf. 
 155. See, e.g., Regulation No. 1999/2 On the Prevention of Access by Individuals and Their 
Removal to Secure Public Peace and Order, UNMIK/REG/1999/2 (Aug. 12, 1999), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/re99_02.pdf; Regulation No. 1999/08 On the 
Establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps, UNMIK/REG/1999/8 (Sept. 20, 1999), amended by 
Regulation No. 2006/3 (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/ 
re99_08.pdf; Regulation No. 2000/33 On Licensing of Security Services Providers in Kosovo and the 
Regulation of Their Employees, UNMIK/REG/2000/33 (May 25, 2000), available at http://www. 
unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2000regs/RE2000_33.htm.  
 156. See, e.g., Regulation No. 2000/4 On the Prohibition Against Inciting to National, Racial, 
Religious or Ethnic Hatred, Discord or Intolerance, UNMIK/REG/2000/4 (Feb. 1, 2000), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2000regs/RE2000_04.htm; 
Regulation No. 2000/10 On the Establishment of the Administrative Department of Health and Social 
Welfare, UNMIK/REG/2000/10 (Mar. 3, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/ 
unmikgazette/02english/E2000regs/RE2000_10.htm; Regulation No. 2000/38 On the Establishment of 
the Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, UNMIK/REG/2000/38 (June 30, 2000), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2000regs/RE2000_38.htm. 
 157. See, e.g., Regulation No. 1999/05 On the Establishment of an Ad Hoc Court of Final Appeal 
and an Ad Hoc Office of the Public Prosecutor, UNMIK/REG/1999/5 (Sept. 4, 1999), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E1999regs/RE1999_05.htm; 
Regulation No. 1999/6 On Recommendations for the Structure and Administration of the Judiciary and 
Prosecution Service, UNMIK/REG/1999/6 (Sept. 7, 1999), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
regulations/1999/re99_06/pdf. 
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opposed to establishing “statehood”), the territorial administration by the 
United Nations qualifies as a state for another reason. “Under international 
law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent 
population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, 
or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such 
entities.”158 
It is beyond dispute that Kosovo has a permanent population159 and a 
defined territory,160 thus the relevant issues are whether the population and 
 
 
 158. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS]; Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro Ed 
Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro In Amministrazione Straordinaria, 937 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 
1991) (applying Restatement (Third) definition of “state”). See also Convention on Rights and Duties 
of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (“The state as a person of international 
law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) 
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”). 
 Notably, recognition of a state by other states is not necessary for satisfaction of the definition. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 202 cmt. b, cited with approval in Kadic v. Karadžić, 
70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995). For an informative discussion of the recognition, or lack thereof, of 
states, see Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)  
 159. “To be a state an entity must have a population that is significant and permanent.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 cmt. c. As of November 2007, Kosovo had a 
population of approximately 1.9 million people. UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMIN. MISSION IN 
KOSOVO, KOSOVO IN NOVEMBER 2007 (2007), http://www.unmikonline.org/docs/2007/Fact_Sheet_ 
nov_2007.pdf. By all accounts, this figure represents a significant amount. For comparison purposes, 
as of July 2007, Montenegro and Macedonia, Kosovo’s neighboring countries, have populations of 
approximately 685,000 and 2.06 million people respectively, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE 
WORLD FACTBOOK 2007 (2007), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/index.html (select appropriate country from pull-down menu), and have been Members of the 
United Nations since June 28, 2006, and April 8, 1993, respectively. United Nations, United Nations 
Member States, Note on Yugoslavia, http://www.un.org/members/notes/yugoslavia.htm (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2008). 
 The debate regarding which ethnic peoples, Serb or Albanian, inhabited the Kosovar region first is 
a significant aspect of the ongoing violence and controversy. Ethnic Serbs claim that, when their 
ancestors traveled south from the Balkans in the sixth century AD, Kosovo was relatively uninhabited, 
except for a few Albanians who then retreated further south. The ethnic Albanians claim that they are 
the direct descendants of Illyrians/Dardanians, the indigenous people of the region, who inhabited the 
area continually since between the sixth and fourth centuries BC. MIRANDA VICKERS, BETWEEN SERB 
AND ALBANIAN: A HISTORY OF KOSOVO xii–xiii, 1–6 (1998). See also NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO: A 
SHORT HISTORY 22–40 (1998). In either case, permanency of the settlement of Kosovo poses no 
problem for purposes of fulfilling the requirements of the definition since the region has continually 
been inhabited since at least the sixth century AD. Note, however, that by utilizing the former 
estimate, I assert no opinion as to which ethnic group inhabited modern day Kosovo first or who is 
“entitled” to inhabit it today. Rather, as a matter of logic, this estimate demonstrates that a settlement 
has been present at least since this era.  
 160. The international borders of Kosovo are those as defined in Annex VIII of the Ahtisaari Plan. 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 8 (Kosovo 2008), available at http://www.assembly-
kosovo.org/?krye=news&newsid=1635&lang=en [hereinafter KOSOVO DECLARATION]. The 
“Ahtisaari Plan,” named after Martti Ahtisaari, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo, 
provided that: 
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territory are controlled by the government asserting statehood,161 and 
whether the putative state has the capacity to engage in formal relations 
with other states. 
Whether an entity exercises governmental control depends on its 
capability to act independently of foreign governments.162 This 
 
 
[t]he territory of Kosovo shall be defined by the frontiers of the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as these frontiers 
stood on 31 December 1988, except as amended by the border demarcation agreement 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
on 23 February 2001. 
The Secretary-General, Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, annex VIII, art. 
3.2, delivered to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/168/Add.1 (Mar. 26, 2007), 
available at http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf. Cf. Klinghoffer, 937 
F.2d at 47 (finding that “contemplat[ion]” of acquiring territory in future is insufficient to meet the 
requirement).  
 Furthermore, “[a]n entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for statehood even if its 
boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or more of its boundaries are disputed, or if some of its 
territory is claimed by another state.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 cmt. b. Thus, 
the territorial claims to Kosovo by Serbia are of no import. See Kraja, supra note 143.  
 161. “While the traditional definition [of a state] does not formally require [the assertion of 
statehood], an entity is not a state if it does not claim to be a state.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS § 201 cmt. f. Concededly, neither the United Nations nor UNMIK has claimed to be a 
state; however, one purpose of the United Nations intervention and civil presence was to determine the 
final status of Kosovo. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 144, ¶ 11(e) (“[T]he main responsibilities of the 
international civil presence will include . . . [f]acilitating a political process designed to determine 
Kosovo’s future status . . . .”); Statement by the President of the Security Council, Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/51 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_pres_ 
statements05.htm (select document “S/PRST/2005/51 of 24 October 2005”) (“The Council therefore 
supports the Secretary-General’s intention to start a political process to determine Kosovo’s Future 
Status, as foreseen in Security Council resolution 1244(1999).”). Thus, for purposes of this Note, I 
assume that if a civil suit were lodged against the United Nations, in which a plaintiff claimed the 
organization was a foreign state, the United Nations would act in a manner similar to other states and 
claim sovereign immunity.  
 Notwithstanding Kosovo’s declaration of independence, KOSOVO DECLARATION, supra note 160, 
in addition to the subsequent and various recognitions thereof, Nicholas Kulish & C.J. Chivers, U.S. 
and Much of Europe Recognize Kosovo, Which Also Draws Expected Rejection, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2008, at A10, the application of this rationale remains viable for two reasons. First, with specific 
regard to Kosovo, the nation has pledged to continue acting in accordance with S.C. Res. 1244. 
KOSOVO DECLARATION, supra note 160, para. 12. See also Press Release, The Secretary-General, 
Secretary-General Says, Pending Security Council Guidance, Resolution 1244 (1999) Will Remain 
Legal Framework for Mandate of UN Kosovo Mission, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/11424 (Feb. 17, 2008), 
available at http://www.un.org./News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11424.doc.htm. Moreover, “[p]ending 
guidance from the Security Council, UNMIK will continue to consider Security Council Resolution 
1244 (1999) as the legal framework for its mandate and will continue to implement its mandate in the 
light of the evolving circumstances.” Id. Second, on a global scale, the rationale is easily applicable to 
all situations in which the United Nations establishes itself as the territorial administration. Indeed, if 
history is an accurate indication of future conduct, the United Nations will, with increasing frequency 
and scope, become the transitional authority in post-conflict territories. See generally supra note 136 
and accompanying text; Wilde, supra note 147 (describing the historical and current practice of 
territorial administration by the United Nations). 
 162. Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 435 (citation omitted). 
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requirement has been interpreted to mean that “the entity . . . be 
independent from direct orders from other State powers” and “have legal 
authority which is not in law dependent on any other earthly authority.”163 
In Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau,164 the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that Palau was not a foreign state under 
international law for purposes of the FSIA.165 The court concluded that it 
was the United States, not Palau, which retained “ultimate authority over 
the governance” of the island group.166 The court reached its decision 
because the “full power of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over 
the territory,” was vested in the United States,167 which, as the 
administering authority, could suspend local laws inconsistent with the 
laws of the United States.168 As a result, “it . . . cannot be said that Palau is 
an entity under the control of its own government.”169 
UNMIK exercises similar plenary powers. Like U.S. governance over 
Palau, UNMIK has full and complete legislative and executive authority 
over Kosovo,170 and can suspend any laws contrary to its mandate.171 In 
 
 
 163. Id. (citations omitted). 
 164. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. Republic of Palau, 924 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 165. Id. at 1247. 
 166. Id. at 1245. 
 167. Id. at 1244 (quoting Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands 
Approved at the One Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Security Council, U.S.-U.N., art. 3, 
Apr. 2, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301). The United States also possessed the right to apply such laws as deemed 
appropriate to local conditions. See Trusteeship Agreement, infra note 170. 
 168. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 44 Fed. Reg. 28,116 (May 14, 1979) [hereinafter Order 
No. 3039], cited in Morgan Guar. Trust, 924 F.2d at 1241. Pursuant to Order No. 3039, the High 
Commissioner (then the Secretary of the Interior), Morgan Guar. Trust, 924 F.2d at 1245, could 
suspend a law if he concluded that it was “inconsistent with the provisions of this Order, the 
Trusteeship Agreement, [or] with existing treaties, laws, and regulations of the United States generally 
applicable in the Trust Territory . . . .” Order No. 3039, supra, at 28,117, § 4. With regard to this 
power to suspend, the Second Circuit stated that “a political entity whose laws may be suspended by 
another cannot be said to be possessed of sovereignty of any kind, de facto or de jure.” Morgan Guar. 
Trust, 924 F.2d at 1245.  
 169. Morgan Guar. Trust, 924 F.2d at 1245 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 170. Compare Regulation No. 1999/1 On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kosovo, 
UNMIK/REG/1999/1, § 1.1 (July 25, 1999), amended by Regulation No. 2000/54 (Sept. 27, 2000) 
(“All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the 
judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General.”) with Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands Approved at the 
One Hundred and Twenty-Fourth Meeting of the Security Council, U.S.-U.N., art. 3, Apr. 2, 1947, 61 
Stat. 3301 (“The administering authority shall have full powers of administration, legislation, and 
jurisdiction over the territory subject to the provisions of this agreement, and may apply to the trust 
territory, subject to any modification which the administering authority may consider desirable, such 
of the laws of the United States as it may deem appropriate to local conditions and requirements.”). 
 171. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo, ¶ 39, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1999/779 (July 
12, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/1999/sgrep99.htm (select document 
“S/1999/77”) (“[The Special Representative] may change, repeal or suspend existing laws to the extent 
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addition, UNMIK has the authority, administered through the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), to disband the Kosovo 
Assembly and call for new elections.172 Consequently, under 
circumstances virtually identical to the trusteeship by the United States 
over Palau, it seems clear that UNMIK is an entity that exercises sufficient 
governmental control over the territory and people of Kosovo.173  
As to the last requirement, the capacity to engage in foreign relations 
depends on two characteristics: competence and separateness. To 
elaborate, “[a]n entity is not a state unless it has competence, within its 
own constitutional system, to conduct international relations with other 
states, as well as the political, technical, and financial capabilities to do 
so.”174 Likewise, when a putative state relies upon another state for its 
international relations, that is, the other state “carries out or accepts 
responsibility” for those relations, then the putative state is not separate for 
purposes of determining capacity.175 
As part of Kosovo’s constitutional system, UNMIK has reserved for 
itself certain powers and responsibilities,176 one of which is the power to 
conclude agreements with states and international organizations.177 The 
constitutional framework further requires the SRSG to “[o]versee[ ] the 
fulfillment of commitments in international agreements entered into on 
behalf of UNMIK.”178 These exclusively reserved constitutional 
provisions—one granting authority to enter into international agreements, 
 
 
necessary for the carrying out of his functions, or where existing laws are incompatible with the 
mandate, aims and purposes of the interim civil administration.”). See, e.g., UN Vetoes Border 
Resolution, BBC.COM, May 23, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2009509.stm. 
 172. Regulation No. 2001/09 On a Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in 
Kosovo, ch. 8.1(b), UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (May 15, 2001), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
pub/misc/FrameworkPocket_ENG_Dec2002.pdf.  
 173. Arguably, as an entity created under the authority of the United Nations and S.C. Res. 1244, 
one could assert that UNMIK is dependent upon another “earthly authority,” see supra text 
accompanying note 163; however, this is immaterial. The authority conferred by the United Nations 
under S.C. Res. 1244 is no different from the authority granted to the United States under the 
Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations.  
 174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 201 cmt. e (emphasis added).  
 175. See Knox v. Palestinian Liberation Org., 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 438 (quoting JAMES 
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (1979)). 
 176. Knoll, supra note 144, at 644. 
 177. Regulation No. 2001/09, ch. 8.1(m), supra note 172 (subject to the scope of S.C. Res. 1244). 
See also id. ch. 8.1(i) (“Exercising powers and responsibilities of an international nature in the legal 
field.”); id. ch. 8.1(o) (“External relations, including with states and international organisations, as may 
be necessary for the implementation of his mandate.”). 
 178. Id. ch. 8.1(n) (emphasis added). “[E]xternal agreements in the ‘reserved areas’ entered into 
by the international administration are of a different nature. As acts of agency performed by the 
international territorial administration, they are not attributable to the UN . . . .” Knoll, supra note 144, 
at 644. 
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the other granting authority to fulfill such agreements—demonstrate that 
UNMIK has sufficient competence and separateness to establish the 
requirement of capacity to engage in international relations.179 
4. Summary 
Under either definition, the United Nations has assumed the role of a 
traditional state, and therefore must be treated accordingly. Despite the 
United Nations’ legal classification as an international organization,180 the 
consequences of “statehood” must necessarily include the loss of absolute 
immunity181 and subjugation to the rigors of the FSIA. Consequently, this 
Note takes the position that the standards enunciated in the FSIA are 
applicable to the United Nations.182 
 
 
 179. The mere fact that a state chooses not to engage in international agreements does not affect 
fulfillment of the definition’s requirements. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 201 
cmt. e (“States do not cease to be states because they have agreed not to engage in certain international 
activities . . . .”). Nevertheless, UNMIK has entered into several such agreements. Press Release, 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Kosovo Joins Enlarged Central European 
Free Trade Agreement, U.N. Doc. UNMIK/PR/1623 (Dec. 19, 2006) (stating, in addition to entering 
the Central European Free Trade Agreement, Kosovo is a signatory to the Energy Community Treaty 
and European Common Aviation Area Agreement).  
 180. Exec. Order No. 9,698, 11 Fed. Reg. 1,809 (Feb. 19, 1946). 
 181. See Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, Special Report No. 1 on the Compatibility with 
Recognized International Standards of UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/47 on the Status, Privileges and 
Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in Kosovo and on the Implementation of the 
Above Regulation, ¶ 23, delivered to the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations (Aug. 26, 2001), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/repository/docs/ 
E4010426a.pdf. (“With regard to UNMIK’s grant of immunity to itself and to KFOR, the 
Ombudsperson recalls that the main purpose of granting immunity to international organisations is to 
protect them against the unilateral interference by the individual government of the state in which they 
are located, a legitimate objective to ensure the effective operation of such organisations. The rationale 
for classical grants of immunity, however, does not apply to the circumstances prevailing in Kosovo, 
where the interim civilian administration (United Nations Mission in Kosovo—UNMIK) in fact acts as 
a surrogate state. It follows that the underlying purpose of a grant of immunity does not apply as there 
is no need for a government to be protected against itself. The Ombudsperson further recalls that no 
democratic state operating under the rule of law accords itself total immunity from any administrative, 
civil or criminal responsibility. Such blanket lack of accountability paves the way for the impunity of 
the state.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 182. In addition to Article 105 of the United Nations Charter, on April 29, 1970, the United States 
acceded to the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900. 
Article 2 of the Convention states that “[t]he United Nations, its property and assets wherever located 
and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in 
any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.” Id. art. 2 § 2. Thus, under the Convention, 
the United Nations is absolutely immune except under its express waiver; there are no other 
exceptions. Boimah v. United Nations Gen. Assembly, 664 F. Supp. 69, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 Concededly, my argument that the United Nations is subject to suit under the FSIA faces a 
formidable obstacle with the immunity granted by this treaty. To be sure, the FSIA expressly provides 
that where the FSIA and a treaty conflict, the treaty prevails. See supra note 45; H.R. REP. NO. 94-
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1487, at 17 (noting that “[i]n the event an international agreement expressly conflicts with [the FSIA], 
the international agreement would control.”). While full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope 
of this Note, I present a cursory overview of how such an argument could be framed.  
 From its inception, the primary responsibility of the United Nations has been the maintenance of 
international peace and security. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. This responsibility is 
vested in the Security Council, which fulfills this duty under authority granted to it by, inter alia, 
Chapters VII and XII. U.N. Charter art. 24, paras. 1, 2.  
 Under Chapter VII, the Security Council is empowered and required to “determine the existence 
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” id. art. 39, and can “decide what 
measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.” Id. 
art. 41. Cf. id. art. 42 (authorizing the use of force if the measures under Article 41 would be or have 
been inadequate to achieve objective).  
 Under Chapter XII, the United Nations must “establish . . . an international trusteeship system for 
the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder . . . .” Id. art. 75. 
Under this trust system, the United Nations is permitted to act as the administering authority over the 
trust territory. Id. art. 81. 
 Certainly, the powers vested in the Security Council under Chapter VII are broad and would seem 
to encompass the administration of a trust territory. Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance 
of Postconflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 83–84 (2001). Yet, the Charter seems to have 
specifically contemplated and provided for this situation with the creation of the trust system in 
Chapter XII. If the power granted to the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII covers international 
administration of territory, why would the Charter provide for similar authority in Chapter XII? Would 
not Chapter XII become mere surplusage under this interpretation of Chapter VII? Against this 
backdrop, one could viably claim that the United Nations failed to properly create the interim 
administration in Kosovo when it invoked its power under Chapter VII. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 
144. In other words, the international administration in Kosovo is illegal. See Epaminontas E. 
Triantafilou, Note, Matter of Law, Question of Policy: Kosovo’s Current and Future Status Under 
International Law, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 368 (2004) (concluding that UNMIK is illegitimate as a 
result of significant deviation from established interpretations of U.N. Charter). But see Matheson, 
supra, at 85 (“[T]he Council’s authority to require measures of the sort already taken in Kosovo . . . 
cannot be doubted.”); Enrico Milano, Security Council Action in the Balkans: Reviewing the Legality 
of Kosovo’s Territorial Status, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 999 (2003) (finding the civil presence in Kosovo 
legal and the KFOR security presence illegal). As such, the impropriety nullifies the territorial 
administration and any derivative immunity received under the Convention.  
 Even assuming, arguendo, that the Security Council can retroactively apply Chapter XII to 
UNMIK, another problem arises; it is only those territories falling within one of three enumerated 
categories which may be placed under the trusteeship system. U.N. Charter art. 77, para. 1. These 
categories are (a) territories held under mandate at the time of establishment of the Charter, (b) 
territories detached from enemy states following World War II, and (c) territories voluntarily placed 
under the trustee system by the state responsible for its administration. Id. Thus, the dispositive issue 
would become whether Kosovo falls within any of the designated trust categories.  
 Clearly Kosovo was neither a territory held under mandate in 1945 nor a territory detached from 
an enemy state following World War II. See Brian Deiwert, Note, A New Trusteeship for World Peace 
and Security: Can an Old League of Nations Idea Be Applied to a Twenty-First Century Iraq?, 14 IND. 
INT’L COMP. L. REV. 771, 792 & nn.239–240 (2004) (identifying the eleven trust territories placed 
under the U.N. trusteeship system). Therefore, only if Kosovo was voluntarily placed within the 
system by the state originally responsible for it would Kosovo satisfy the third category. Certainly, a 
colorable argument exists that Serbia did not agree to such international intervention or governance. 
See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text; see also Deiwert, supra, at 792 (noting that only India 
has attempted such placement under Article 77(1)(c)). If this were the case, the establishment of 
UNMIK, even under the trust system, would be contrary to international law.  
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE FSIA TO THE MITROVICA SHOOTING 
A. Procedural Aspects 
Unlike many other federal and state statutes, the FSIA does not provide 
any substantive rules for liability.183 Instead, the FSIA merely explicates 
the circumstances by which a court may establish and exercise jurisdiction 
over a foreign sovereign. 
Although “Congress has the undisputed power to decide, as a matter of 
federal law, whether and under what circumstances foreign nations should 
be amenable to suit in the United States,” such actions raise “sensitive 
issues concerning the foreign relations of the United States . . . .”184 
Consequently, “[a]t the threshold of every action in a district court against 
a foreign state, . . . the court must satisfy itself that one of the exceptions 
[of the FSIA] applies—and in doing so it must apply the detailed federal 
law standards set forth in the Act.”185 
In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,186 the Supreme 
Court further elaborated on the requirements necessary for a court to 
exercise jurisdiction over a foreign nation. According to the Court, 
[s]ections 1604 and 1330(a)[187] work in tandem: § 1604 bars federal 
and state courts from exercising jurisdiction when a foreign state is 
entitled to immunity, and § 1330(a) confers [subject matter] 
jurisdiction[188] on district courts to hear suits brought by United 
 
 
 183. Robinson v. Gov’t of Malay., 269 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The FSIA itself does not 
provide any substantive tort law to guide [a court’s] inquiry. It is ordinary tort law that applies to non-
immune foreign governments and into which the court’s inquiry [should] properly [be] directed.”) 
(citing First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611, 620 (1983)). 
See also § 1606, which provides that “[a]s to any claim for relief with respect to which a foreign state 
is not entitled to immunity under section 1605 or 1607 of this chapter, the foreign state shall be liable 
in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . .” 28 
U.S.C. § 1606 (2007). 
 184. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983). 
 185. Id. at 493–94. 
 186. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
 187. See § 1604. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) provides that  
[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of 
any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to 
any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to 
immunity either under sections 1605–1607 of this title or under any applicable international 
agreement. 
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (2000). 
 188. The Court also addressed under what circumstances a court has personal jurisdiction:  
[s]ubsection (b) of 28 U.S.C. § 1330 provides that ‘[p]ersonal jurisdiction over a foreign state 
shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have [subject-matter] 
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States citizens and by aliens when a foreign state is not entitled to 
immunity.189 
B. “Substantive” Analysis 
1. The Non-Commercial Tort Exemption: § 1605(a)(5) 
Sections 1605 through 1607 of the FSIA provide the exclusive means 
through which a plaintiff can overcome the obstacles imposed by the grant 
of immunity articulated in section 1604.190 Generally referred to as the 
non-commercial tort exception, section 1605(a)(5) removes the grant of 
immunity from a foreign sovereign upon the occurrence of a tortious act or 
omission.191 As the name implies, this exception allows individuals to 
pursue claims against foreign governments for actions resulting in 
personal injury or death.192 Originally intended to permit victims of traffic 
accidents to recover from a foreign sovereign defendant,193 the broad 
language of the provision encompasses victims of other tortious actions as 
well.194 
 
 
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under [28 U.S.C. § 1608].’ 
Thus, personal jurisdiction, like subject-matter jurisdiction, exists only when one of the 
exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity in §§ 1605–1607 applies. 
Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 435 n.3 (first alteration added) (citing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 485, 489 & 
n.14). 
 189. Id. at 434. 
 190. Since immunity is an affirmative defense, the foreign defendant has the burden of proving its 
claim of immunity. As part of this burden, the foreign state must produce evidence that the state (or 
instrumentality) is in fact the defendant and the act complained of was a public act (i.e., not within an 
exception). Once this prima facie evidence is produced, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show 
the state is not entitled to immunity. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 17. However, “even if the foreign state 
does not enter an appearance to assert an immunity defense, a district court still must determine that 
immunity is unavailable under the Act.” Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493 n.20. 
 191. Section 1605(a)(5) provides that  
[a] foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of 
the States in any case — not otherwise encompassed in [the commercial activities exception], 
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or 
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or 
omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting 
within the scope of his office or employment; except this paragraph shall not apply to — (A) 
any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused, or (B) any claim arising 
out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or 
interference with contract rights. 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (2000). 
 192. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 21. 
 193. Id. at 20. 
 194. Id. at 20–21. But see MacArthur Area Citizens Ass’n v. Peru, 809 F.2d 918, 921 (D.C. Cir. 
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All such claims, whether caused by traffic accidents or other tortious 
conduct, must comply with the “substantive”195 elements enumerated in 
1605(a)(5), provided however, that the action does not fall within the 
commercial activities exception.196 Thus, in order to prevail, a plaintiff 
must seek monetary damages from a qualified foreign defendant for 
conduct resulting in personal injury or death caused by the tortious act or 
omission of the foreign state, its officials, or employees.  
Having concluded that the United Nations is a qualified foreign state, 
and with the Mitrovica incident in mind, it seems clear that the injured 
officers could seek monetary compensation from the United Nations for 
the injuries received as a result of the shooting. 
What is not as clear, however, is whether the shooting by the Jordanian 
can be considered the conduct of an employee acting within the scope of 
employment. Because the non-commercial tort exception is essentially a 
respondeat superior statute,197 courts confronted with this issue must first 
answer the question of what law to apply.198 Consequently, whether the 
injurious conduct was within the scope of employment of the tortfeasor 
will be determined by a jurisdiction’s substantive law.199 
 
 
1987) (finding that “the legislative history counsels that the exception should be narrowly construed so 
as not to encompass the farthest reaches of common law”). 
 195. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 196. § 1605(a)(5). The commercial activities exception, enumerated at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2), 
provides that a foreign state is not immune when  
the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign 
state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity 
of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a 
direct effect in the United States. 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2000). 
 197. Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim (Rendall II), 932 F. Supp. 19, 24 (D.D.C. 1996) (noting that 
“[s]ection 1605(a)(5) is essentially a respondeat superior statute, providing an employer with liability 
for certain tortious acts of its employees”) (emphasis in original). 
 198. Liu v. China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1426 (9th Cir. 1989). At least two circuits are split on what 
substantive law should apply in FSIA cases. In re Texas E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination 
Ins. Coverage Litig., 870 F. Supp. 1293, 1336 n.61 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (noting the split). The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals applies the federal choice of law rule. Under this rule, courts apply the law of 
the forum where the injury-causing conduct occurred, unless another jurisdiction has a more 
significant relationship to the tort and the parties. Liu, 892 F.2d at 1425–26. On the other hand, the 
Second Circuit applies the law of the forum. Barkanic v. Gen. Admin. of Civil Aviation of the 
People’s Republic of China, 923 F.2d 957, 959–61 (2d Cir. 1991).  
 199. See McKeel v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The FSIA . . . 
does not affect the substantive law of liability. That liability–were a court to reach the merits of 
appellants’ claims–would be determined by state or Iranian law.”) (citation omitted). Although such 
analysis is far beyond the scope of this Note, as a matter of pure speculation, I think it highly doubtful 
that a court would find that Ali’s homicidal conduct was within the scope of his employment as an 
international police officer. Compare Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim (Rendall I), 942 F. Supp. 621, 626 
(D.D.C. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 107 F.3d 913 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that assault and battery 
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The final element, and of fatal consequence here, is the requirement 
that the injury occur within the United States.200 This requirement is 
distinguishable from any necessity that the conduct, i.e., the tortious act or 
omission, occur within the United States.201 However, regrettably for the 
injured American officers, courts addressing this issue have interpreted the 
statutory language as requiring that both the conduct and injury occur 
within the United States.202 While there is no doubt that the United States 
can exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction,203 doing so could produce 
significant policy problems and anomalous results.204 
 
 
performed by employee of international organization was not within scope of employment) and Skeen 
v. Brazil, 566 F. Supp. 1414, 1418 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding that assault and shooting by employee of 
foreign country did not further the sovereign’s interest and was not reasonably foreseeable as natural 
result of employment) with Liu, 892 F.2d at 1431 (under California law, the Republic of China was 
vicariously liable for government official’s order for assassination of historian and journalist in United 
States). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY, §§ 7.03, 7.07 (2006).  
 To the extent that the officers could reframe their cause of action on the theory that the United 
Nations negligently hired or negligently supervised Ali, this claim has been explicitly rejected as 
“merely a semantic ploy” by the Supreme Court. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) 
(“[A] plaintiff could recast virtually any claim of intentional tort committed by sovereign act as a 
claim of failure to warn, simply by charging the defendant with an obligation to announce its own 
tortious propensity before indulging it. To give jurisdictional significance to this feint of language 
would effectively thwart the Act’s manifest purpose . . . .”). Contra id. at 375 (Kennedy, J., dissenting 
in part) (“As a matter of substantive tort law, it is not a novel proposition or a play on words to 
describe with precision the conduct upon which various causes of action are based or to recognize that 
a single injury can arise from multiple causes, each of which constitutes an actionable wrong.”). 
 200. For purposes of the FSIA, the term “United States” is defined as “all territory and waters, 
continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (2000). 
 201. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 WILLAMETTE J. 
INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 136 (2001). 
 202. Id. at n.328. Cf. id. at 137 & n.330 (“Several courts have stressed that the ‘entire tort’ must 
occur within the United States.”). But see Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 292 F. Supp. 2d 9, 
19 n.4 (D.D.C. 2003) (following the statutory language and finding that only death or injury need 
occur in the United States). 
 203. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991) (“Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United 
States.”). 
 204. Dellapenna, supra note 201, at 138 (“If there were no territorial restriction on the tortious act 
or omission, foreign sovereigns could be subject to suit in American courts for tortious conduct 
committed anywhere in the world, so long as the conduct had effects—no matter how tenuous—in the 
United States. These cases would likely be especially offensive to foreign sovereigns, raise difficult 
questions of causation, and burden an already overloaded federal court system. In addition, allowing 
these suits would create an anomaly whereby some direct victims of foreign torts could not sue under 
the Immunities Act (because the tort and injury occurred abroad), but some third parties affected by 
the very same torts would be able to sue.”) (footnote omitted). 
 Likewise, as was feared when the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act was proposed, 
other nations may choose “to respond in kind, thus potentially subjecting the American government to 
suits in foreign countries for actions taken in the United States.” Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 89 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
654 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 7:619 
 
 
 
 
2. The Re-immunizing Clauses 
Nevertheless, even if all the aforementioned requirements are met, a 
foreign state will still retain immunity if the alleged tortious conduct falls 
within either of two enumerated exceptions to the non-commercial tort 
provision.205 The first exception tests whether the conduct at issue was 
performed (or not performed) at the discretion of the actor, regardless of 
whether the discretion was abused. The second exception examines 
whether the conduct arose out of a discrete class of pre-defined activities. 
Addressing the latter exception first, it is evident that the officers’ 
claim does not arise out of any statutorily defined conduct.206 Therefore, 
the foreign sovereign would be unable to avoid liability because of a 
failure to meet the requirements of the second escape clause. 
The first exception is not as easily dismissed. “In order for the tortious 
activity exception to be applied . . . , the torts alleged by [the officers] 
must not involve the exercise of discretionary functions.”207 Whether a 
discretionary function has occurred is determined by applying principles 
developed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act.208 The Supreme Court 
in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig 
Airlines)209 developed a two-pronged test for determining whether a 
discretionary function applies in a particular case.210 Under the Varig 
Airlines test, a court must initially examine the nature of the conduct, as 
opposed to the status of the tortfeasor, and then inquire as to whether the 
conduct was grounded in the foreign sovereign’s social, economic, or 
political policy.211 
 
 
 205. Alicog v. Saudi Arabia, 860 F. Supp. 379, 382 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (“The tort exception has 
exceptions itself . . . .”); see supra note 191. 
 206. The re-immunizing conduct as it pertains to the escape clause in § 1605(a)(5)(B) is malicious 
prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract 
rights. See supra note 191. 
 207. Joseph v. Office of the Consulate Gen. of Nig., 830 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 208. Id. (citing Olsen v. Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 646–47 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 917 
(1984)). Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 933 (1949) (codified as amended in various 
sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 209. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 
797, 813–14 (1984). 
 210. Joseph, 830 F.2d at 1026. 
 211. Id. 
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In order for the Mitrovica officers to prevail, the Varig Airlines test 
must demonstrate that the conduct at issue is not a discretionary function. 
Applying the test to the Mitrovica shooting reveals that the exception will 
be inapplicable; that is, the conduct will not be found to be a discretionary 
function of the United Nations. Ignoring, as required, the status of Ali as 
an armed police officer of the defendant, the bellicose nature of Ali’s 
conduct is outside the type of conduct that Congress intended to shield 
from tort liability212 or that would be sanctioned by a foreign sovereign.213 
Furthermore, the conduct does not further any social, economic, or 
political policy of the United Nations.214 
C. A Modest Proposal for Reform  
Although the United Nations will be unable to utilize either of the 
provision’s two escape clauses in order to retain its much daunted 
immunity, the innocent victims of the Mitrovica shooting spree will, 
likewise, be unable to maintain a successful action against the United 
Nations for the conduct of its Jordanian employee. This lamentable 
conclusion necessarily begs the question of whether the FSIA should be 
amended in some fashion to permit such claims. 
Despite statutory language that only injury or death need occur within 
the United States, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dictum215 in Amerada Hess 
ably justifies why a strict interpretation of the statute would be 
 
 
 212. Kalasho v. Iraq, No. 06-11030, 2007 WL 2683553, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 7, 2007) (noting 
that kidnapping, private imprisonment, assassination, attempted murder, assault and battery, and arson 
are not discretionary functions); Liu, 892 F.2d at 1431 (“hold[ing] that the discretionary function 
exception is inapplicable when an employee of a foreign government violates its own internal law”). 
See Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813. 
 213. But see, e.g., de Letelier v. Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259, 266 (D.D.C. 1980) (assassination of 
Chilean ambassador in United States was directed by Chilean officials). 
 214. See Liu v. Republic of China, 642 F. Supp. 297, 305 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (killing of U.S. 
citizens is not a policy option available to foreign countries). See also de Letelier v. Chile, 488 F. 
Supp. 665, 673 (D.D.C. 1980) (“While it seems apparent that a decision calculated to result in injury 
or death to a particular individual or individuals, made for whatever reason, would be one most 
assuredly involving policy judgment and decision and thus exempt as a discretionary act under section 
1605(a)(5)(A), that exception is not applicable to bar this suit. As it has been recognized, there is no 
discretion to commit, or to have one’s officers or agents commit, an illegal act. Whatever policy 
options may exist for a foreign country, it has no ‘discretion’ to perpetrate conduct designed to result 
in the assassination of an individual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of 
humanity as recognized in both national and international law.”) (citations omitted). 
 215. Cicippio v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 F.3d 164, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (the statement is 
dictum because the conduct occurred outside the United States); Dellapenna, supra note 201, at 137 
n.329. 
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insufficient, assuming all other elements are met, to overcome the 
presumption of immunity for foreign states. The Chief Justice averred: 
The result in this case is not altered by the fact that petitioner’s 
alleged tort may have had effects in the United States. . . . Under the 
commercial activity exception to the FSIA, § 1605(a)(2), a foreign 
state may be liable for its commercial activities ‘outside the territory 
of the United States’ having a ‘direct effect’ inside the United 
States. But the noncommercial tort exception, § 1605(a)(5), . . . 
makes no mention of ‘territory outside the United States’ or of 
‘direct effects’ in the United States. Congress’ decision to use 
explicit language in § 1605(a)(2), and not to do so in § 1605(a)(5), 
indicates that the exception in § 1605(a)(5) covers only torts 
occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.216 
In light of this dicta and conflicting court interpretations,217 I propose 
that the non-commercial tort exception be amended by mirroring the 
language in the commercial activities exception.218 This change would 
unambiguously expand the jurisdiction of U.S. courts over conduct, 
occurring outside the United States, which has direct effects inside the 
United States.219 However, because of various policy concerns,220 the 
imposition of additional conditions is recommended to temper any 
 
 
 216. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 441 (1989). Chief 
Justice Rehnquist’s conclusion is further supported by the legislative history of the FSIA, H.R. REP. 
NO. 94-1487, at 21 (“[T]he tortious act or omission must occur within the jurisdiction of the United 
States . . . .”), and precedent. Persinger, 729 F.2d at 843 (citing Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 
23 (1983)) (“When Congress uses explicit language in one part of a statute to cover a particular 
situation and then uses different language in another part of the same statute, a strong inference arises 
that the two provisions do not mean the same thing.”). But see id. at 843–44 (Edwards, J., dissenting in 
part) (discussing multiple reasons to adhere to the statutory language).  
 217. See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
 218. See supra note 196. Cf. Dellapenna, supra note 201, at 139 (recommending an amendment to 
the situs requirement but only to the extent that a “substantial portion” of the tortious conduct occur in 
the United States). 
 Since § 1605(a)(5), as proposed, will still only pertain to “ordinary” torts, I see no conflict with 18 
U.S.C. § 2337, which bars actions pursued against foreign states under 18 U.S.C. § 2333. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2337(2) (2000). 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) permits civil actions for acts of international terrorism. 18 
U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2000).  
 219. In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992), the Supreme Court 
rejected the suggestion that the phrase “direct effect” should be construed as requiring “substantiality” 
or “foreseeability.” Following the principle that jurisdiction must be based on more than “purely trivial 
effects,” the Court endorsed the court of appeals’ recognition that “an effect is ‘direct’ if it follows as 
an immediate consequence of the defendant’s activity.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 220. See supra note 204. 
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perceived harshness of the proposed amendment.221 For instance, the 
plaintiff could be required to show that the tortfeasor was motivated, in 
part, to act because of the victim’s nationality. In other words, the victim’s 
nationality played some role, however minor, in the victim-selection 
process.222 Likewise, Congress could strictly define what type of conduct 
is actionable; permitting, for example, actions only when serious bodily 
injury or death occurs, while excluding traffic offenses.223 Finally, 
Congress could authorize such actions only when the forum where the 
conduct occurs lacks an available remedy.224 Conditions such as these 
would not be overly burdensome on a plaintiff and, at the same time, 
would alleviate the concerns expressed about the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States in the area of non-
commercial torts.225 
 
 
 221. But see Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1998) (“The state 
sponsored terrorism provisions represent a sea change in the United States’ approach to foreign 
sovereign immunity. For the first time, Congress has expressly created an exception to immunity 
designed to influence the sovereign conduct of foreign states . . . .”).  
 222. Under the “passive personality” principle, a state exercises jurisdiction extraterritorially on 
the basis of the victim’s nationality. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 cmt. g. While 
this basis is generally insufficient for ordinary torts, id., I argue that when the victim is targeted 
because of her nationality, a sufficient basis for jurisdiction exists. Cf. United States v. Vasquez-
Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 n.7 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that extraterritorial jurisdiction is inappropriate 
for random murder of Americans abroad suggesting that murder was not based on nationality). In this 
sense, a tort in which particular victims are selected based on nationality is an amalgam of an ordinary 
tort and terrorism, and lies on the theoretical continuum between the two. 
 In any event, jurisdiction is valid under my proposed amendment because “[j]urisdiction with 
respect to activity outside the state, but having or intended to have substantial effect within the state’s 
territory, is an aspect of jurisdiction based on territoriality . . . .” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN 
RELATIONS § 402 cmt. d. 
 223. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (2003) (extraterritorial application of criminal law limited to 
homicide, conspiracy to commit homicide, and conduct resulting in serious bodily injury). 
 224. See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 73 
(1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)) (“A court shall decline to hear a claim under this section 
if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the conduct 
giving rise to the claim occurred.”). 
 As it pertains to UNMIK, this condition would become especially relevant. See Regulation No. 
2000/47 On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of KFOR and UNMIK and Their Personnel in 
Kosovo, § 3.1, UNMIK/REG/2000/47 (Aug. 18, 2000), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2000regs/RE2000_47.htm (“UNMIK, its property, funds and 
assets shall be immune from any legal process.”). See also supra note 181.  
 225. See supra note 204. Admittedly, the most important policy concern expressed against 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is that the proposed change may be especially offensive to other nations. 
This is so because the United States could be viewed as holding other nations, which may have values 
different from those of the United States, to account for failure to conform to U.S. standards. However, 
by limiting causes of action to certain categories of conduct, perhaps only those in violation of the law 
of nations, any offensiveness will be significantly reduced. Moreover, even if the injury-causing 
conduct falls outside of internationally-recognized harms, a state still has several defenses available, 
such as the Act of State doctrine, or that the conduct was either within the scope of employment of the 
actor or the result of a discretionary decision. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Long gone are the days when international organizations were minor 
participants in global politics in need of protection from member states. 
Today, these organizations, especially the United Nations, have 
accumulated immense wealth and wield vast amounts of power. Under 
such conditions, the lack of absolute immunity appears neither to threaten 
the existence of the organization nor its functionality. 
Regrettably, whether utilizing either the statutory construction basis or 
the statehood theory, any claims made by the injured officers or their 
 
 
 Likewise, it has been suggested that, should the United States exercise the form of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction that I have proposed, other nations will follow suit, thus subjecting the United States to 
similar claims in those nations. While technically true, this idea ignores my “available remedy” 
requirement. Thus, if another state adopted an extraterritorial tort provision, then the United States is 
exposed to no more risk than if no provision existed at all because the United States provides an 
available forum and remedy vis-à-vis the Federal Tort Claims Act. Furthermore, nothing prevents 
another nation from enacting such a provision even if the United States fails to do so. If this were the 
case, the United States would be subject to suit abroad without any international parity. 
 It is also correct that, as a result of the proposed language, an “anomaly” could possibly result 
such that, while some direct victims would be unable to sue, some third parties affected by the same 
tort would be able to do so. Under the current regime, unless the conduct and injury occur within the 
United States, victims are unable to prevail on otherwise viable claims against a foreign sovereign. I 
argue that, despite any theoretical inequity among those who have been injured as a result of 
extraterritorial conduct, it is far better to allow a portion of this class of victims to bring claims rather 
than disallow the entire group. 
 Another concern is that if jurisdiction is expanded to cover conduct outside of the United States, 
there will be difficulties in proving causation. This concern is tenuous at best. Merely because the 
conduct may occur in a foreign land does not automatically make proof of this element any more 
difficult than if the conduct occurred in the United States. Indeed, the commercial activity exception 
routinely requires courts to determine whether an activity outside the United States caused a direct 
effect inside the United States. Likewise, under the Alien Tort Statute, U.S. courts have accepted 
jurisdiction over claims when the injurious conduct has occurred in foreign lands without evidentiary 
problems. 
 As perhaps a last ditch effort to avoid application of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the much-abused 
and oft-cited “floodgates” argument has been propounded. To be sure, any time jurisdiction is 
expanded or a new cause of action is created, courts may face an increase in workload. Yet, if 
lawmakers or judges had succumbed to this argument every time it was put forth, it is likely that many 
beneficial changes in the law would never have come to fruition. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 410–11 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring), Justice 
Harlan persuasively wrote:  
The only substantial policy consideration advanced against recognition of a federal cause of 
action for violation of Fourth Amendment rights by federal officials is the incremental 
expenditure of judicial resources that will be necessitated by this class of litigation. . . . 
Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these days. Nonetheless, when we 
automatically close the courthouse door solely on this basis, we implicitly express a value 
judgment on the comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests. And current 
limitations upon the effective functioning of the courts arising from budgetary inadequacies 
should not be permitted to stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound 
constitutional principles.  
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executors against the United Nations for damages resulting from the 
Mitrovica shooting will prove futile because of an inability to meet the 
minimum requirements of the FSIA’s non-commercial tort exception. This 
fact alone demonstrates that, under either of the proposed theories, 
including the statutory amendment recommended in this Note, 
international organizations are well-protected by the FSIA.  
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